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During the last decade, policymakers, economists, and the 
public at large have been engaged in a heated debate over 
U.S. immigration policy. On one side of the debate are those 
who advocate stricter limitations on immigration because, 
even if immigration is beneficial to some, the gain is at the 
expense of others. Most advocates of restrictive immigration 
reform argue that it is the public's obligation to protect the 
interests of low-skilled workers who are hurt by the entry of 
aliens with whom they compete directly for jobs. On the 
other side of the debate are those who argue that immigra 
tion can only be beneficial. By preventing the free flow of 
labor across national boundaries, we have little to gain and 
much to lose.
In all, the immigration debate is multifaceted, with nearly 
as many approaches to the problem, suggestions for reform, 
and arguments buttressing the status quo as there are par 
ticipants in the debate. Both advocates of reform and those 
supporting the status quo make their cases in strikingly dif 
ferent ways. This volume, which collects six papers delivered 
as public lectures at Western Michigan University during the 
1984-1985 academic year, reflects these many views about 
the effects of immigration on the United States economy and 
about reform of the current system.
The objective of most who advocate immigration reform 
is to lower the effective immigration rate the combined
2 Many Guises of Reform
flow of legal and illegal immigration. To that end, reformers 
emphasize eliminating or at least reducing 
significantly the current flow of illegal immigration. 
Although many policies have been put forward to reduce this 
flow, all essentially fall into one of two categories. On the 
one hand, policies could be implemented that increase the 
personal cost of migrating illegally to the United States. 
Alternatively, the benefits that accrue to undocumented 
workers could be reduced. In either case, fewer would 
choose to incur the costs that accompany migration.
One way of increasing the personal cost of migrating il 
legally would be to devote more resources to patrolling the 
border. Increased surveillance would raise the probability 
that an illegal migrant would be apprehended during cross 
ing. Greater border enforcement may do little to deter the il 
legal immigrant who crosses seldom and remains for a long 
period in the U.S., but would increase significantly the costs 
to the frequent border crosser, and in particular reduce the 
number of commuters who live in Mexico and travel daily to 
jobs in the United States. (As Michael J. Piore argues in this 
volume, however, such a policy may paradoxically increase 
permanent settlement as commuters choose to remain in 
definitely in the U.S. since the probability of gaining entry 
during subsequent crossings is decreased.)
Alternatively, detention of illegal aliens for an extended 
period of time would also cause the personal costs of 
uninspected entry to rise. Currently, an apprehended alien is 
simply returned to his or her country of origin. Thus, the 
pecuniary costs of apprehension are relatively small, con 
sisting of one's earnings foregone during the detention 
period and travel. With an extended detention period, 
however, the pecuniary costs would be greater, rising with 
the length of the detention period. Jagdish N. Bhagwati 
makes a case for detention coupled with the development of
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an economic zone at the border which would provide an 
alternative to entering the United States.
A problem arises with the implementation of policies that 
increase the costs to aliens of illegal entry. The budgets of 
agencies that would be responsible for implementing these 
policies would need to be enlarged significantly. However, 
such an increase is politically difficult to promote, given the 
current need to curb government expenditures. Attention has 
turned instead to reducing the benefits that accrue to illegal 
entrants. For instance, if fines and penalties were imposed 
on employers who knowingly hire undocumented workers, 
illegal aliens would face greater difficulties and a smaller 
probability of finding employment. Hence the returns or 
benefits that accrue to illegal immigrants would fall. 
Presumably the number of undocumented migrants would 
fall along with the reduced incentives to migrate. This was 
the approach of the Simpson-Mazzoli bill passed by the 
House and Senate in 1984 but never signed into law. 1 Subse 
quent attempts at immigration reform have continued to 
focus on the imposition of penalties on employers who hire 
illegal aliens.
The political appeal of reforms that reduce the benefits il 
legal immigrants can expect suggests that the public views 
these policies as less costly than border enforcement policies. 
These perceptions may or may not be true.
How are taxpayers, employers, and consumers affected by 
the two alternative approaches to immigration reform? 
Border enforcement would presumably require a large infu 
sion of tax dollars into the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) to support a larger and more effective force of 
border agents, and to finance the detention of illegal aliens in 
some humane way. Taxpayers, however, would not be 
spared under a system of employer sanctions. It is the con 
sensus of most who favor employer sanctions that they be
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implemented hand-in-hand with a system that would allow 
employers to verify the citizenship or immigration status of 
individuals. It is imperative that this verification procedure 
be virtually costless to employers in order to prevent 
discrimination against legal aliens, such as Hispanics, who 
might appear foreign. Hence, if employer sanctions were im 
posed, a verification system would have to be financed 
through the tax system. Either policy, border enforcement or 
employer sanctions, would require large increases in the pool 
of revenues used to implement and enforce federal immigra 
tion law.
A further hidden cost of employer sanctions is noted by 
Barry R. Chiswick in this volume. Chiswick warns that 
employer sanctions are the equivalent of an employer tax, in 
creasing hiring costs. Though intended to reduce the employ 
ment of illegal aliens, this policy would have the additional 
unintended effect of also reducing employment of low- 
skilled native workers.
Ultimately the economic effects of tighter border policy 
and penalties against employers who hire illegal aliens may in 
fact be identical. It may be necessary in either case for firms 
to alter their input mix and to change usually 
decrease their level of output. If, as some argue, there are 
few native workers willing to take the jobs that aliens 
generally hold, then imposing either restrictive policy will 
cause the cost of unskilled labor to rise as the flow of illegal 
aliens is curtailed. It follows that producing any given level 
of output becomes more costly. But if native workers are 
willing to work in jobs often held by aliens, costs are much 
less likely to be affected by a reduced flow of immigrants. 
The point is that it does not matter which of the two ap 
proaches greater border enforcement or employer sanc 
tions is taken. Production costs either rise or do not de 
pending on the availability of domestic low-skilled workers.
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How then do consumers fare under the two alternatives? 
Depending on how the employers' costs respond to fewer 
aliens, consumers will either find prices of goods and services 
rising or remaining unchanged. If adjustments are costly and 
difficult to make if in fact firms find it necessary to alter 
the production methods significantly due to changes in the 
relative prices of inputs the reduced stock of immigrants 
will likely be felt by the consumer as the prices of goods and 
services at least partly reflect higher costs. If the firm's costs 
do not change as a result of a smaller stock of illegal aliens, 
then consumers will not see increases in the prices of goods 
and services. Again, it is unimportant whether the policy im 
plemented is border control or internal enforcement. The ef 
fects on consumers are the same.
Whether in fact consumers are harmed by restrictive im 
migration policy, and whether employers can expect costs to 
increase, depends on whether illegal aliens and domestic 
workers are good substitutes in production. This is an issue 
that has received much attention but on which no consensus 
has been reached. The answer to this question is important 
not only because of the effects of immigration policy on the 
consumer, but because it is important to understand the im 
plications of policy alternatives on domestic workers.
Are native workers harmed or helped by restrictive im 
migration reforms? If native workers and immigrants are 
good substitutes, then natives will be helped by restrictions 
as either their wages rise or their employment opportunities 
improve compared with a more open border policy. If native 
and foreign workers are complements in production then the 
native workers gain from the availability of more foreign 
workers and lose from restrictive immigration policy. If 
some groups of native workers are substitutes for im 
migrants, and others are complementary with immigrants, 
then the impact of immigration restrictions would be
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uneven, and the potential for conflict over reform great. In 
this collection of papers the issue of substitutability is 
discussed in detail by George J. Borjas. Vernon M. Briggs, 
Jr., develops an interesting implication of the debate over 
substitutability by arguing that the current immigration 
policy (or nonpolicy) undermines policy designed to aid 
minorities and the poor.
Although there are direct costs of imposing immigration 
restrictions, many argue that they are smaller than the costs 
that are imposed by the existence of large communities of 
legal and illegal aliens. Immigrants, they argue, participate 
in income maintenance programs and strain public services 
such as education and medical care. In addition, if im 
migrants and natives are substitutes in production, increased 
immigration may cause native workers to earn lower wages 
and suffer more unemployment such that more become eligi 
ble for public assistance. In sum, immigration may impose 
greater costs on U.S. taxpayers than is immediately ap 
parent. Some of these issues are addressed by Francine D. 
Blau, who has analyzed data on the use of transfers by im 
migrants and natives.
The immigration debate is not likely to be concluded in the 
near future. There are too many opposing interest groups, 
too little consensus over what are the important issues, and a 
dearth of evidence that could be drawn upon to resolve these 
differences.
NOTE








There has been a very rapid increase in the number of im 
migrants admitted to the United States in the postwar 
period. During the 1950-1960 decade, for example, an 
average of 251,500 immigrants per year were admitted into 
this country. This number had increased to over 390,000 per 
year during the 1970-1980 decade. The rapid increase in the 
number of immigrants has raised (again) the very old ques 
tion of whether or not the U.S. benefits from immigration. 
Surprisingly, even though immigration has been an impor 
tant part of demographic change and of population growth 
in the United States practically throughout its entire history, 
very little is known as to how immigration affects different 
sectors of the economy. Are workers, firms, and consumers 
helped or hurt by immigration?
In this lecture I would like to try to provide an understand 
ing of what facts we need to know before we can provide a 
valid assessment of this important question. Despite what 
self-appointed immigration experts claim, existing research 
is so preliminary (and often so contradictory) in its conclu 
sions that it is entirely inappropriate to make sweeping 
generalizations based on that literature. Nevertheless, ex 
isting research does provide valid hints and clues as to what 
kinds of questions policymakers should be asking in trying to 
assess the impact of immigration on the United States. My
8 Immigrants & the Labor Market
objective in this survey is to provide an outline of what cur 
rent research has to say about this important issue: What 
kinds of questions are relevant and what do we know about 
the answers to these questions?
I should stress at the beginning of the survey that my focus 
is exclusively on the economic costs and benefits associated 
with immigration. This is not to say that there are not other 
important issues e.g., the impact of immigrants on the 
political structure of governmental units of the U.S. 
However, most research has concentrated on the economic 
aspects of immigration, and this, too, will be the focus of my 
analysis.
There are two questions which I believe are most relevant 
in any assessment of the economic impact of immigration. 
First, how well do immigrants do in the U.S. labor market? 
In a competitive labor market, workers are paid the value of 
their marginal productivity. In other words, worf crs are 
paid the value of the contribution that they make to the 
firm's output. By analyzing how immigrants do in the labor 
market, by studying the level of immigrants' earnings and 
comparing them to the level of native-born earnings, we are, 
in effect, calculating the value of the contribution that im 
migrants make to national output. This research question is 
the one that has received the most effort from social scien 
tists interested in immigration phenomena. A common find 
ing in this literature is that immigrants have lower earnings 
than the native-born when they first arrive in this country, 
but that over time the earnings of immigrants grow very fast 
and eventually immigrant earnings actually overtake and 
surpass the earnings of the native-born. It is not uncommon 
in these studies to find that after 10 to 15 years in the U.S. 
the typical immigrant is earning more than the typical native- 
born person. These kinds of findings not only help 
perpetuate the Horatio Alger myth, but also have the impor-
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tant policy implication that immigrants, through their higher 
productivity, actually make a significant contribution to 
U.S. national product.
The second question that is relevant for an assessment of 
the economic impact of immigrants "twists'* the first ques 
tion around: from how immigrants do in the labor market, 
to what immigrants do to the labor market? This is probably 
the question that receives the most media concern. There are 
endless anecdotes of immigrants arriving in the U.S. and 
"taking jobs away" from specific groups of native-born 
workers. Despite the appeal of such anecdotal evidence, the 
fact remains that not a single shred of evidence acceptable to 
a social scientist even with the most liberal standards of 
scientific analysis has been produced substantiating these 
anecdotal claims. Certainly, as immigrants enter the U.S. 
labor market in large numbers it seems reasonable to expect 
that these shifts in supply would have an impact on the earn 
ings and employment of native-born groups. As will be seen 
below, however, regardless of the magnitude of the shift in 
immigrant supply, economic theory cannot predict unam 
biguously the direction of the change in immigrant earnings 
and employment. In particular, immigrants may 
"substitute" for native-born workers (as the anecdotal 
evidence implicitly assumes) or they may "complement" 
native-born workers in the production process. All scientific 
studies of this important question suggest that immigrants 
have had a minor impact on the U.S. labor market, and not a 
single study in this literature has provided evidence of the 
large negative impacts assumed in media discussions of this 
issue.
It is my contention that no valid assessment of the 
economic impact of immigration in this country can be made 
unless we can provide measures of the dollar costs (or 
benefits) associated with each of these two issues. In the re-
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mainder of this lecture I will summarize the current state of 
knowledge in each of these questions, and, with some luck, 
raise some doubts as to how much we really do know about 
any of these important policy issues.
The Earnings of Immigrants
How do immigrants do in the labor market? This ques 
tion, by far, has dominated most of the empirical research in 
the immigration literature. To address this problem the 
researcher must simply compare the earnings of the native- 
born with the earnings of the foreign-born. In principle, 
therefore, it is a trivial exercise. Despite the simplicity of this 
task, however, the first such study in the modern literature 
did not appear until 1978 when Barry Chiswick published an 
influential paper on the "Americanization" of immigrant 
earnings. Using the 1970 Census cross-section, Chiswick's 
analysis revealed two major findings:
1. The earnings of recently arrived immigrants are 
significantly lower than the earnings of immigrants who have 
been in this country for longer periods; and
2. After 10-15 years, the earnings of immigrants overtake 
the earnings of the native-born, so that earlier waves of im 
migrants are valued more by the U.S. labor market than the 
native-born population.
The thrust of these findings is illustrated in Figure 1. The 
typical native-born age-earnings profile is upward sloping 
throughout much of the working life cycle. The typical im 
migrant migrates at age t0, and at that time his earnings are 
significantly lower than those of the native-born population. 
Over time, however, the earnings of immigrants rise at a 
significantly higher rate than those of the native-born (as in 
dicated by the steeper slope of the age-earnings profile of im 
migrants in Figure 1). The difference in these slopes leads to
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Figure 1
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an overtaking age of t, which Chiswick found was 10-15 
years after age tg. Thus for a large portion of the life cycle 
Chiswick found that immigrants had higher produc 
tivity and hence were valued more by the U.S. labor 
market than the native-born population. This remarkable 
finding gave birth to the current conventional wisdom that 
immigrants assimilate quite well in the United States.
These results have a great deal of appeal to labor 
economists trained in the human capital tradition since 
human capital theory can be easily invoked to explain (part 
of) these empirical regularities. In particular, persons im 
migrating to the United States for "economic" reasons have 
strong incentives to devote a large fraction of their effort and 
time to the process of accumulating human capital or skills 
valued by U.S. employers. These incentives are, of course, 
created by the fact that the typical immigrant incurred 
substantial costs in immigrating, and the returns to these in 
vestment costs can only be obtained through high earnings in 
the U.S. labor market. These high human capital investment 
volumes explain why immigrants' earnings rise at a faster 
rate than native-born earnings. They do not, however, ex 
plain the existence of an overtaking age since there is no ob 
vious reason why the total stock of human capital should be 
greater for immigrants than for the native-born. To explain 
the overtaking point Chiswick introduces the deus ex 
machina of "selection biases." That is, for reasons that are 
not well understood, the immigration policies of the United 
States (as well as the emigration policies of sending coun 
tries) combined with the economic incentives motivating in 
dividuals to migrate lead to an immigrant population that is, 
on average, "better" than the native-born population. This 
greater quality (in terms of earnings potential) of immigrants 
is, therefore, responsible for the fact that over a large por 
tion of the working life, immigrants apparently have higher 
earnings than the native-born.
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An extensive literature developed following the ap 
pearance of Chiswick's paper. This literature borrowed both 
the conceptual framework and empirical methodology of 
Chiswick's analysis, and, by and large, concluded that 
Chiswick's results were quite robust. Cross-section studies of 
immigrants by sex, by national origin, by race, etc., all led to 
the same essential finding: after a period of adaptation (or 
assimilation) immigrants do quite well in the U.S. labor 
market.
A recent paper of mine (Borjas 1985a), however, questions 
the validity of this finding. The fallacy in the Chiswick-type 
literature is its use of cross-section data sets (a "snapshot" 
like the U.S. Census) to explain the dynamic series of events 
which we call "assimilation." In other words, it is incorrect 
to study how different immigrants do (in terms of earnings) 
at a given point in time, and to infer from that how the earn 
ings of a given immigrant grow over time. There are two 
serious biases which destroy the validity of this inference. 
The first of these biases arises from the fact that many im 
migrants eventually return to their country of origin. 
Estimates of the emigration rates of the foreign-born 
population in the United States range from 20-30 percent. It 
is unlikely that the incidence of emigration is distributed ran 
domly in the immigrant population. Instead, immigrants 
who emigrate are likely to leave the U.S. for specific reasons. 
One such possibility is that things simply did not work out 
for them in the U.S. labor market. In a sense, then, the 
"failures" leave the United States. If so, the earlier waves of 
immigrants will be composed only of "successes," while the 
more recent waves contain both "successes" and the 
"failures" who will eventually leave. This kind of sample 
composition will clearly lead to the result that earlier waves 
of immigrants earn more, on average, than the more recent 
waves even if no assimilation truly exists.
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The second problem with the cross-section results is the 
implicit assumption that different waves of immigrants are 
identical in average quality (even if there were no 
emigration). This hidden (and heroic) assumption forces the 
reader to believe that the quality of immigrants who arrived 
in the U.S. in the 1940s is the same as that of immigrants 
who arrived in the U.S. in the 1960s and in the 1980s. The 
fact that U.S. immigration policy went through a major revi 
sion in 1964 is enough to make an analyst aware of the im- 
plausibility of this kind of analysis. In addition, however, 
political and economic upheavals in sending countries have 
clearly had an impact on the size, on the racial, and on the 
national origin composition of the immigrant flow to the 
United States. If these events have led to a decline in the 
quality of immigrants admitted to the U.S. in the postwar 
period, the Chiswick-type cross-section result of Figure 1 
would again be generated since earlier waves would be ex 
pected to have higher earnings than the more recent arrivals.
In my 1985a paper, I address this problem by conducting a 
joint analysis of the 1970 and 1980 U.S. Censuses. If the 
cross-section studies are right, specific cohorts of immigrants 
(e.g., Cubans who arrived in 1965-1969) should do substan 
tially better in the 1980 Census than in the 1970 Census. In 
fact, they do not. The tracking of a large number of im 
migrant cohorts over the 1970-1980 period reveals that, in 
most cases, the cross-section studies greatly overstate the ac 
tual improvement that took place in immigrant earnings dur 
ing that time period. Hence the reason that earlier waves of 
immigrants earn more than the recent waves has little to do 
with the assimilation stories that dominate the literature. 
Rather it has to do with the fact that there has been a 
precipitous decline in the quality of the immigrant pool ad 
mitted to the U.S. in the postwar period.
There still remains the question, however, of what policy 
implications, if any, are suggested by this revisionist view of
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Figure 1. Clearly, my results imply that the productivity of 
immigrants has fallen over time. Yet, one can still ask: So 
what? Is this secular decline in quality a good or a bad thing? 
I do not know the answer to this question. Since the in 
dustrial structure of the U.S. economy has changed rapidly 
since 1940 (and will likely continue to change) it is unclear 
that we need 500,000 professionals immigrating to the U.S. 
every year. My results must, therefore, be interpreted in the 
context of the kinds of jobs that are being generated by the 
U.S. economy and not simply on the qualifications of the 
new entrants.
The Impact of Immigrants
A complete assessment of the relationship between im 
migrants and the U.S. labor market requires knowledge not 
only of how they do in the labor market, but also of what 
they do to the market. In other words, what is the impact of 
immigrants on the earnings and employment of the native- 
born population?
It is easy to show that, despite the deeply held (and almost 
religious) beliefs of many analysts who have studied this 
question, theoretically it is impossible to predict whether im 
migrants diminish or expand native-born employment op 
portunities. Consider Figure 2. The first graph describes the 
labor market facing immigrants: Sj is the supply curve of im 
migrants and DJ is the demand curve for immigrant labor. In 
a competitive labor market, the Lj immigrants employed 
would earn earn Wj dollars. Suppose now that a political 
crisis abroad leads to a sizable increase in the number of 
foreign-born persons in the U.S. This crisis shifts the supply 
curve for immigrant labor from Sj to S^, and, as expected, 
even though more immigrants are employed in the new labor 
market equilibrium (employment is now given by Lj), the 
wage each immigrant gets is reduced to W[. In a sense, im 
migrants compete for jobs with themselves, and hence an in-












(Assuming immigrants and native-born are substitutes)
Employment
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Figure 2 (continued) 
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crease in the supply of immigrants must (in this simple 
model) lead to reduced earnings opportunities for the entire 
immigrant population.
The second graph of Figure 2 illustrates the impact of the 
increased supply of immigrants on native-born earnings and 
employment if it is assumed that immigrants and native-born 
workers are substitutes in production. The curves Sn and Dn 
are the initial supply and demand curves of native-born 
workers. The shift in the supply of immigrants will likely 
have an impact on the demand for native-born workers. It is 
often claimed usually without any evidence that im 
migrants and native-born workers compete for the same 
kinds of jobs. Economists define this situation as one in
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which immigrants and native-born workers are substitutes in 
production. That is, both foreign- and native-born workers 
do the same kinds of jobs and hence the demand for native- 
born workers will fall to D^ when the supply of immigrants 
increases. This shift in demand will lead to less native-born 
employment and to lower native-born wages. In a sense, the 
fact that immigrants and native-born workers are alike i.e., 
are substitutes in production implies that the entry of new 
immigrants reduces the productivity of the native-born 
population and hence reduces Wn. This is, of course, the 
typical assumption in discussions of this issue both in the 
media and in many academic articles.
There is, however, an alternative assumption that on a 
priori grounds is equally valid: immigrants and native-born 
workers are complements in production. This kind of 
technological relationship arises, for example, when an il 
legal alien mows the lawn at my house. We both gain: he gets 
a job and a salary, and I get to devote my time to research. In 
this scenario, the productivity of the native-born population 
increases when new immigrants come in. As illustrated in the 
third graph of Figure 2, this leads to an upward shift in the 
demand curve for native-born labor increasing both native- 
born employment and earnings.
To repeat, it is theoretically impossible to predict whether 
immigrants diminish or expand the employment oppor 
tunities of the native-born. The direction of the impact of 
immigrants on the earnings and employment of the native- 
born is entirely an empirical question and can be settled only 
by reference to available data.
A few papers have attempted to conduct empirical studies 
of this issue. (See Borjas 1983, 1985b, 1986; Grossman 
1982.) The methodology in these studies is based on the in 
sight that a few labor markets (or SMSAs) traditionally 
receive most of the immigrant labor. Hence the comparison
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of earnings levels in these labor markets with the earnings 
levels in labor markets with relatively few immigrants should 
reveal the direction of the shift in the demand curve for 
native-born labor. The results from the studies are sum 
marized in Table 1. This table presents the estimated percent 
age impact of native-born earnings (by type of native-born 
worker) if the (white) immigrant population were to increase 
by 10 percent. Table 1 reveals numerically trivial impacts. 
The earnings of white native-born workers are reduced by 
only 0.2 percent, while the earnings of black native-born 
workers increase by 0.2 percent. These numerically trivial ef 
fects suggest two important findings: First, the issue of 
whether the demand curve shifts up or down is somewhat ir 
relevant. Immigrants have practically no impact on the de 
mand curve for native-born workers. Second, the many 
discussions that implicitly assume a high degree of 
substitutability between immigrant and native-born labor are 
far off the mark. These discussions are not only misleading 
and dogmatic, but are also erroneous.
Table 1 
Estimates of Impact of Immigrants on Earnings of Native-Born
A 10 percent increase in the 
number of white immigrants
Type of native-born reduces or increases the earnings 




Asian . 1 %
SOURCE: Borjas, 1985b.
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It should be stressed, however, that this type of study is 
still in its infancy. Many more empirical studies of this type 
are required before these results can form the basis for in 
formed policymaking. Nevertheless, the few studies that do 
exist, using different data and methodologies, cannot find 
any evidence of sizable negative impacts. And this finding, in 
light of the discussions that dominate the literature, is quite a 
surprise.
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology
I began working on migration in 1972 after spending a 
year and a half in Puerto Rico. When I came back to Boston 
at the end of that period it seemed to me that all of a sudden 
there were Puerto Ricans all over Boston. I wasn't sure 
whether that was an illusion on my part that came from a 
sudden, heightened consciousness about Puerto Ricans in 
general, or whether indeed, there had been a new migration 
of Puerto Ricans to Boston. So I began to investigate the 
origins of the Puerto Rican community in Boston.
In the process, I actually found the origins of the Puerto 
Rican community in Boston. I went into one factory where 
the employer pulled off the factory floor a gentleman who 
said he had come to Boston in 1954. I asked him how large 
the Puerto Rican community was in 1954 and he said, "Well 
let me see. There was Juan, Jose ..." and he named eight 
people. But, I also found that the Puerto Rican community 
in Boston, while a lot larger in 1972 than eight people, was 
also not all Puerto Rican. Indeed, a large number of the peo 
ple who claimed to be Puerto Rican, or who at least were 
presented to me as Puerto Rican, actually came from other 
parts of the Spanish speaking Caribbean and many of them 
were in the United States illegally.
At that time immigration was not a very much talked 
about phenomenon, but since then, especially since 1972, it
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has become a focal point of public policy. In the last ten 
years it appears to have gained a permanent place in the 
public policy agenda. We have just gone through a long 
debate over what is the latest piece of immigration legisla 
tion, the Simpson-Mazzoli bill. While that legislation was 
defeated, or at least tabled, it is almost certain that there will 
be another piece of immigration legislation in the coming 
Congress. So it is largely to that debate, raised by the im 
migration reform legislation, and in light of a series of 
research projects that began with that study of Puerto Rican 
migration but extended from there to the issue of migration 
in general, that I would like to address my remarks.
The Illegal Immigration Problem
The central concern in the public debate has largely been 
clandestine immigration. Estimates of the number of people 
in the country without proper documents range from 3 to 12 
million. 1 Interestingly enough, those figures the 3 and the 
12 million have remained constant over the ten-year 
period. Most of these people are here to work, hence the no 
tion that they take jobs from Americans. The rhetoric of the 
immigration debate implies that, in addition, the existence of 
so many people here in direct contradiction to announced 
public policy, represents a threat to the general social order 
and hence to the safety and security of the rest of us. Their 
ambiguous legal status certainly places the people themselves 
in a precarious social position. It makes it difficult to 
educate their children, to obtain the protection of labor 
legislation in the workplace, or off the job to obtain protec 
tion from the abuses of landlords, moneylenders or the 
wrath of angry relatives and neighbors or rejected suitors, all 
of whom can at any moment in time turn them in to the im 
migration authorities.
The dominant view about this immigration appears to be 
that the immigrants are driven by a desperate attempt to
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escape the poverty and depression of their own countries, 
which constitutes an inexorable force driving them towards 
the United States. This view is not always made explicit but it 
underlies the continual reference to the economic conditions 
in places like Mexico, to the population pressures in the 
underdeveloped world, and to the high unemployment rates 
or so-called underemployment in these areas. Given the fact 
that the United States is surrounded by poverty, it implies 
that we will be inundated with immigrants. When figures 
about income levels and population growth along our 
southern border are presented in combination with the 
figures about the numbers of clandestine immigrants already 
here, it seems that we are already being inundated.
Alternative Policies to Control 
Illegal Immigration
This notion of the immigration process invites a policy of 
massive retaliation. To halt the invasion in this way, one 
would have to control the two major streams of clandestine 
immigration. One of those streams consists of people who 
enter without inspection, that is, basically, cross the border. 
The second group consists of a group called "visa violators'* 
who enter with documents, largely tourist documents but 
some student visas, and then violate the conditions of those 
visas either by working while they are here or by staying after 
the visas have expired.
Border Control: In principle, true border control is prob 
ably possible. The U.S.-Mexican border is very long, but 
most of it consists of desert which is difficult to cross and 
easy to police with aerial equipment. Most of the entry oc 
curs in large urban areas. The present border control force is 
small. As the former Labor Secretary, Ray Marshall, was 
fond of pointing out, the border patrol, in fact, is smaller 
than the Capitol Hill police force. Current smuggling opera 
tions are relatively primitive and unorganized. More
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resources alone would go a long way to counter those opera 
tions.
On the other hand, the whole nature of the immigration 
process undoubtedly changes under the impact of a massive 
control operation. There would be an escalation both in the 
technology and the organizational efforts on the other side 
of the border and probably a change in the locus of entry. 
Border patrol would thus undoubtedly be considerably more 
expensive than it appears to be at the current time. The final 
cost in terms of resources, not to mention human rights, 
could be quite large. But in my own judgment, if the control 
activity were done with a well-conceived and carefully im 
plemented organizational structure, that is to say, if it were 
not done in panic, it could probably be pulled off.
Visa Controls: Visa violations, on the other hand, are a 
good deal more difficult to control. Almost all visa violators 
come to the United States for ostensibly legitimate reasons: 
to visit relatives, for tourism, shopping and for education. 
Attempts to curtail visa violations by tightening up the pro 
cedures through which visas are granted inevitably interfere 
with these processes in very serious ways. The consulates 
who issue visas are overworked and understaffed and could 
easily absorb more resources. But it is not clear that more 
resources alone would solve this problem. Resource con 
straints seem, in fact, to be one of the major factors control 
ling the number of visas actually issued at the moment. More 
resources would probably make the process fairer, but might 
actually increase the flow. It is very difficult to judge the ac 
tual motivation of an applicant, and since many of those 
who eventually violate their visas have legitimate reasons for 
visiting the United States and may not even contemplate visa 
violation in advance, it is not clear that the process could be 
fully controlled in this way. I think it is important to note 
that a lot of students who end up violating their visas really 
do come here for education and change their minds only
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after they get here about whether or not they want to stay. 
That's probably even more true of visitors who come from 
foreign countries to visit friends and relatives and then 
somehow stay longer than they intended, getting a job to 
finance their extended stay.
Employer Controls: The difficulties of direct control, the 
hopelessness of controlling visa violation, and the cost of 
border control have forced attention on a third pro 
posal employer liability. By a quirk in the immigration 
legislation employers are in no way responsible for checking 
the legal status of their employees. Reformers have 
argued and this is one of the central provisions of virtually 
every bill that has been proposed, including the Simpson- 
Mazzoli bill that if employers were made responsible for 
verifying the legal working status of employees, the jobs 
which are the chief attraction for the immigrants would be 
cut off, and immigration would dry up.
It is probably true that this would be the case, but job con 
trol is no panacea. The exact nature of present employers' 
liability has been somewhat distorted by the advocates of this 
reform. Employers are not, it is true, liable for having un 
documented workers on their payroll, but they are liable if 
they actively and knowingly engage in recruitment. Such 
recruitment has at times been fairly widespread although 
very circumspect. The immigration service has not been very 
successful in developing cases against this kind of recruit 
ment, largely because such cases are difficult to prove 
without extensive investigation which the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) does not have the resources to 
conduct. More stringent forms of liability would reduce the 
investigative burden, but only marginally.
For really effective enforcement, employers would have to 
have some means of verifying the status of the job applicant. 
This would necessitate a national identity card which poses
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apparently insurmountable civil rights problems. Such a 
system would also be very expensive. Budget estimates run to 
several billions of dollars. By themselves, therefore, 
employer sanctions are unlikely to have much of an effect 
one way or another. To be effective they would require a 
massive infusion of resources for the immigration service. 
These resources would be almost as effective under present 
legislation if they were devoted to investigations and Im 
migration and Naturalization Service raids of existing 
employers, but we have consistently judged the cost of all 
these activities to be too great. Thus, there is a sense in which 
the flood of immigrants, which the conventional view 
predicts, seems inevitable. American culture seems doomed 
to either drown in a sea of foreign languages and alien 
customs, or to degenerate as the immigrants drive down our 
standard of living and we divert increasing resources to 
securing our borders and make progressive compromises on 
our basic human values in order to keep aliens out.
Fortunately, however, there is very little evidence to sup 
port the theory which underlies the conventional wisdom. It 
seems logical that the income gap between the United States 
and the underdeveloped world should be the basic governor 
of the immigration process. But that does not, in fact, seem 
to be the case. The migrants are not coming from the poorest 
countries in the world and they are not coming from the 
poorest regions in their countries of origin. This remains true 
even when some effort is made to correct the figures for the 
cost of transportation or even information about job pro 
spects. Mexican migrants to the United States, for example, 
come from places like Jalisco in the middle of the country 
and from Mexico City, not from the relatively poor Yucatan. 
The poorest country in the Western Hemisphere is Haiti. It 
has been the poorest for many, many years, but until quite 
recently Haiti was not a principal source of migrant workers 
and historically and to a lesser extent even now, the Haitian
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migration is primarily composed of the relatively well-to-do 
and well-educated middle class.
Conventional Migration Theory Fails to Explain 
Present and Past Rates of Immigration
Any theory of migration must explain its timing. The cur 
rent wave of clandestine migration is recent. It dates from 
the late 1960s. A large income differential between the 
United States and the countries of origin has, however, 
always existed and if anything has probably been narrowing 
over the last ten years. Nor is it possible to account for the 
recent migration flows through other changes in the cost dif 
ferential. Transportation costs, for example, have been 
remarkably stable over long periods of time. The cost of air 
transportation from the Caribbean in the early 1970s (and 
that's the period when immigration seems to have really 
begun) is approximately the same percentage of the unskilled 
worker's weekly wage as the cost of steamship passage from 
Italy in the 1880s.
Insofar as I can judge from talking to immigrants, the im 
migration process does not work as the conventional wisdom 
presumes because the potential immigrants view the United 
States much as Americans view the immigrants. The im 
migrants are deeply attached to their language and culture 
and strongly rooted in their own communities where they 
feel comfortable and at home. They find American society 
cold and alien, strange, lonely and frightening. Their migra 
tion is thus not a sign of the special attraction of the United 
States, but paradoxically of a commitment to their home 
community. Generally, they have some particular project at 
home which motivates the migration process: Landholdings 
which they would like to expand or improve, agricultural 
equipment or livestock they plan to purchase, an interurban 
taxi or hack, a small store, in some areas a piece of industrial 
equipment for a home factory. Their notion is to come to the
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United States temporarily, work hard for a relatively short 
period of time, and then return home using the accumulated 
earnings to finance their project. 2
This, incidently, is true not just of the current migration, 
but it has been true historically as well. Late nineteenth cen 
tury migrants from southern and eastern Europe seem to 
have come from areas of small land holdings where projects 
to expand or improve agriculture were widespread among 
the peasantry. The rates of return or rate of emigration 
among these early migrants were quite high, overall 32 per 
cent of all immigrants between 1908 and 1910 (a period for 
which we have complete figures) returned. 3 For some groups 
the rate was much higher. Sixty-three percent of northern 
Italian migrants to the United States and 56 percent of the 
southern Italians, for example, went home in that period. 
The fact that immigrants are motivated in this way limits the 
range of jobs for which employers find them attractive. 
They're not attractive for jobs to which adult national 
workers normally aspire. Such jobs require a long-term com 
mitment on the part of the labor force, high levels of educa 
tion, training and experience, and a stable regular labor 
force commitment.
The Secondary Labor Market 
As an Explanation for Immigration
Thus, the immigration process tends to be governed by, 
and respond to what we call the secondary sector of the labor 
market jobs which are relatively low paying, insecure, have 
menial social status, and lack any career advancement. Such 
work is not attractive to committed national workers precise 
ly because it has no future and adds little to the self- 
definition and esteem of those who perform it. The im 
migrants are undeterred by these same characteristics 
because they view their stay as temporary. They plan to leave
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before they are laid off. They do not think of themselves as 
staying long enough to take advantage of career oppor 
tunities and they obtain their self-definition from the work 
they perform at home. Since it is the jobs in the secondary 
sector for which migrants are an attractice source of labor, it 
is these jobs which control the immigration process.
We do not know why the economy generates secondary 
jobs. A good many of the jobs which clandestine immigrants 
now hold were previously held by other migrant groups: 
first, by foreign immigrants from southern and eastern 
Europe and subsequently black workers migrating from the 
rural south. The new immigration dates from the late 1960s 
when unemployment, under the impact of the Vietnam War 
boom, reached extremely low levels. In this period, the labor 
reserves in the rural south were virtually exhausted and the 
black labor force became dominated by a second generation 
which had grown up in the cities. Case study evidence sug 
gests that this new generation, whose attitudes were crystaliz- 
ed by the civil rights movement, were increasingly perceived 
by employers as intractable and difficult, if not actually 
dangerous, to manage. 4 Faced with a general labor shortage 
and a great distrust of the existing workforce, businessmen 
thus began to look around for new sources of labor and they 
found them increasingly among foreign workers. In a 
number of cases the employer's efforts seemed to have been 
deliberate and purposeful, but they went largely unnoticed as 
policy focused on obtaining higher levels of jobs for blacks. 
In some cases businesses actually seemed to have recruited 
from abroad, and this was the origin of the new migration 
stream.
The character of an immigration stream does not, 
however, remain static. It changes significantly over time. 
Most early immigrants plan to stay only temporarily, but 
many end up staying longer than they intended. Some of
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them eventually settle permanently in the United States. 
Even those who finally do return often have children who 
grow up in the United States, cut off from their parents' 
country without the cultural and linguistic ties that bind their 
parents to the place of origin. The long-stayers and their 
children form a permanent settlement whose members, 
especially in the second generation, have needs and aspira 
tions which parallel those of the U.S. nationals. Indeed, for 
practical purposes, many are U.S. nationals whatever their 
legal status. Return is not a viable option.
Once a permanent community forms in the United States 
the character of the new migrants also begins to change. It 
becomes feasible to move to the United States and settle per 
manently without experiencing the cultural alienation and 
strangeness which deters this kind of migration in the begin 
ning and more people begin to do so. Thus, an immigration 
process which begins initially as essentially complementary 
to the needs and aspiration of U.S. nationals generates over 
time a second generation and a growing group of first 
generation immigrants who are in competition with 
American nationals for stable career jobs.
Where are we in this process at this time? If the recent 
wave of immigration began in the late 1960s, it is now almost 
20 years later. The country has accumulated a substantial 
reserve of undocumented immigrants and the original fluid 
immigration stream has begun to solidify. Most of the public 
discussion seems to presume that this is the case. People talk 
as if time alone makes this problem more and more pressing. 
But here too, this is by no means clear. The initial upsurge of 
immigration in the late 1960s was a response to two factors: 
an unusually tight labor market with levels of unemployment 
much lower than any experienced since, and a relatively sud 
den shift in the character of the black labor force, who had 
previously been staffing secondary jobs. The vacuum that 
this created at the bottom of the labor market, into which the
International Migration 31
new immigrants were pulled, could not have been greatly ex 
panded since that time and with rising unemployment may 
actually have shrunk. In the last five years there has also 
been a substantial infusion of refugees. The refugees have 
moved into jobs very comparable to those held by un 
documented migrants. But, the refugees have a permanent 
commitment to the U.S. which the migrants do not and un 
doubtedly push many of the migrants out. However settled 
the original migrant communities have become, we know 
from case studies and anecdotal evidence that the numbers 
who are temporarily here, remain substantial. 3 Because these 
people are here to save money they are not interested in 
waiting out unemployment. They do not stay in the United 
States. If jobs are unavailable they go home. Indeed, as one 
migrant commented, "It is not worth my while to stay here if 
I can't hold at least two jobs." At their core, the immigrant 
communities may now be sufficiently solid to resist the 
pressure of unemployment and the competition of the 
refugees, but there is still a wide periphery of workers who 
must have responded to the changing economic conditions 
and the new competition by leaving the United States.
Economic troubles in Mexico are thought to be augment 
ing undocumented migration, but this presumption is also 
dubious. Nobody seems to have argued during the Mexican 
oil boom of the late 1970s that the undocumented migration 
from that country diminished. If the boom did not diminish 
the migration, it is unclear why the bust should augment it. 
However bad things are in Mexico, one can probably do bet 
ter there surrounded by a family and embedded in a com 
munity network than in the United States without a job and 
ineligible for unemployment insurance or social welfare. In 
any case, much of the argument applies to economic refugees 
from Mexico, as it does to political refugees from Cuba, 
Asia, and El Salvador. To the extent that they have a 
stronger motive to stay in the United States, they're likely to
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replace temporary migrants from other countries in the 
hemisphere. This displacement effect undoubtedly operates 
least effectively in the West where Mexicans predominate, 
but strongly in the Midwest and the East Coast where Mex 
icans are only one of an immense number of different na 
tional groups which make up the immigrant population.
Finally, what is almost never recognized in assessing the 
evolution of the clandestine immigration population is that a 
very large proportion of those people who do settle per 
manently manage to legitimize their status. The official im 
migration system in the United States operates through a 
system of equity, or preference, to give enormous weight to 
family reunification. The spouse, parents, and the children 
under the age of 21 of U.S. citizens are admitted outside the 
official immigration quotas. The preference system allocates 
20 percent of the overall quota of 270,000 immigrants to un 
married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens, 26 percent to 
unmarried sons and daughters of permanent resident aliens, 
10 percent to married sons and daughters of citizens and 24 
percent to brothers and sisters of citizens. Very few people 
develop a desire to settle permanently in an area without 
developing the social and family ties which would eventually 
qualify them for a permanent immigration visa under one or 
another of these various family unification provisions. In ad 
dition, the wives or husbands of U.S. citizens come in out 
side the quota system altogether. Most visa violators come to 
the United States as family visitors with exactly the kinds of 
ties which would permit them to legitimize their status initial 
ly. It is common practice for undocumented aliens to apply 
for official admission, come to the United States, live and 
work clandestinely while their application is pending, and 
then return home when it comes through to pick it up at the 
office. In this way, documented and undocumented migra 
tion are intertwined and the pool of undocumented workers 
is continually diminished by official migration.
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The estimates of the stock of undocumented migrants 
have, as I said at the beginning, remained constant. That is, 
the range has always been three to twelve million over the 
whole course of this debate. It is generally supposed that this 
is due to the width of the range and that the true figure has 
moved up over time. Given rising unemployment, the com 
petition of refugees, and the processes of legitimization 
through official immigration, however, the true figure might 
as well have actually declined. It is in the nature of this pro 
cess that we can never know what the true figure is because, 
obviously, clandestine migrants are not volunteering infor 
mation about their presence in the United States.
Immigrant and Native Workers: Two Case Studies
What does this alternative view of immigration imply for 
public policy? The major concern of public policymakers is 
the threat which immigration poses to income and employ 
ment opportunities of American nationals. In the conven 
tional understanding, the immigrants constitute a generaliz 
ed threat. In the process just sketched out, the threat is much 
more limited and confined. The immigrants, at least in the 
early stages of the process, do not threaten the employment 
opportunities of permanent adult workers, particularly those 
in jobs requiring a long-term career commitment. Indeed, in 
sofar as a certain amount of menial, unskilled and unsecured 
workers are necessary to sustain stable, long-term job oppor 
tunities, the immigrants may actually complement these 
types of national workers. The competition occurs between 
the immigrants and other marginally committed labor force 
groups, particularly youth and secondary women workers 
whose primary commitment is to home and family respon 
sibilities. Even that kind of competition is difficult to assess. 
The nature of the labor force commitment of these groups is 
in itself ambiguous. The jobs at stake are, moreover, in com-
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petition with foreign producers and any attempt to replace 
the immigrant labor force with nationals might simply drive 
the work abroad.
The difficulties for analysis and policy are illustrated by 
two studies of New York City industries, one by Thomas 
Baily (1985) of the New York City restaurant industry, the 
second by Roger Waldinger (1985) of the New York City gar 
ment industry.
The Restaurant Industry: In the restaurant industry, im 
migrants tend to be concentrated in a distinct sector of ethnic 
restaurants owned and managed by immigrant en 
trepreneurs. This sector coexists with two other sectors the 
fast food sector typified by McDonald's, which is staffed 
primarily with young part-time workers, and full service 
restaurants owned by American nationals who employ some 
immigrants but also a certain number of nationals. Baily 
argues, on the basis of a comparison with other cities which 
have much smaller immigrant groups, that the competition 
between immigrants and nationals is not a direct one, but oc 
curs through the relative sizes of these different sectors. 
Without the immigrants, he argues, the fast food sector 
would be much larger, McDonald's would substitute for the 
Greek coffee shop at the bottom of the price line, and limited 
menu steakhouses would substitute at the top. This is partial 
ly a substitution of youth for immigrant labor. However, a 
good deal of the fast food operation is industrial. The food 
and equipment are prepared in remote manufacturing 
establishments. These establishments tend to offer relatively 
unskilled jobs which are accessible to immigrants. These jobs 
have schedules and locations which are not attractive to the 
youth. The manufacturing activities can, moreover, be easily 
performed abroad. Clearly, the jobs lost by immigrants 
would not be converted to youth restaurant jobs on a one- 
for-one basis. It is not completely clear that youth could be 
attracted to fill every new restaurant job created by curtail-
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ing immigration. The restaurants in the nonimmigrant cities 
which Baily examined have a dispersed population and a 
largely family clientele. They are located near the youth 
which they employ. New York City restaurants have a pro 
fessional and business clientele in the center city, remote 
from the residence of young workers.
The Garment Industry: Employment patterns in the gar 
ment industry are equally complicated and ambiguous. 
Waldinger argues that the industry in New York also caters 
to a particular segment of the national market. It concen 
trates upon the production of short runs of specialty items 
for a spot market. It therefore needs the large flexible 
sources of labor which the immigrants provide. The im 
migrant communities also provide a certain skill continuity 
which is otherwise difficult to maintain and which is par 
ticularly important given the type of production in which the 
city specializes. Outside the city, production is of a very dif 
ferent sort. It consists of much longer runs of the products 
which are more standard and/or are ordered in advance. For 
example, highly stylized dresses are produced in New York 
City, while more standardized items such as blue jeans are 
produced elsewhere in long-run operations. The first order 
of standardized garments for the season will be produced 
outside New York. But there will be last minute spot orders 
which need to be filled on short notice. These are generally 
produced in New York itself along with specialized orders. 
The long-run type of production was originally done in New 
York, but because it requires fewer skills, benefits from large 
production facilities, and supports the time delays involved 
in remote production, it moved out of the city during the 
postwar decades, first to rural areas in the U.S., and then 
abroad.
With the new immigration, some long-run production has 
come back to New York City. It is difficult to imagine the 
garment industry without a fashion center like New York
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and the spot market segment of the industry which resides 
there. New York's chief American competitors are Miami 
and Los Angeles, both of which use a similar immigrant 
labor force. Without any immigrants the whole industry 
might move abroad. The recent return of long-run produc 
tion to New York City has been, at the expense, in part, of 
farm wives in rural Pennsylvania, upstate New York, and the 
south, and in this case the immigrants do compete with 
American nationals. But it has also been at the expense of 
foreign production, and the domestic production which 
moved to New York might otherwise have moved to those 
foreign locations. The significance of the jobs lost to the 
farm wives is also debatable. Before the factories moved into 
these areas, most of these women had never considered 
working. The rural labor force was a creation of the 
employers, in much the same way the immigration labor 
force in the city is the product of employer recruiting.
To summarize, it is not clear that prohibiting the employ 
ment of immigrants in these industries would necessarily in 
crease employment of native workers. Immigrants readily 
substitute for a marginally committed and less skilled labor 
force. Employers appear reluctant to hire the mostly younger 
and less skilled native workers. It is likely that reducing the 
availability of foreign workers would only induce these 
employers to relocate their firms abroad.
Policy Prescriptions
Taken together, these considerations lead me to conclude 
that the concern which has motivated current legislative pro 
posals is misplaced and the legislation itself is ill-conceived. 
We ought, I would argue, nontheless, make an effort to limit 
and control the immigration process. The reason for doing 
so is that over a very long period of time immigration does 
have the capacity to erode the employment opportunities of 
national workers, and because generally, a tight labor
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market in which labor is in short supply is more conducive to 
social progress than a loose one.
Limit Immigration by Improving Working Conditions: 
The best way to limit immigration, however, is by direct con 
trol over employment conditions, by raising wages and im 
proving working conditions of the jobs to which immigrants 
are attracted in the hope that this will eventually attract na 
tional workers in their place. Policy instruments for doing 
this are available in our labor standards legislation and the 
National Labor Relations Act. I would, therefore, rather 
devote the resources we are currently talking about diverting 
to the enforcement of immigration legislation to enforce 
ment of these pieces of labor legislation, and legislate 
reforms which would raise the minimum wage, facilitate 
union organization, tighten health and safety standards, and 
the like. I prefer this policy to tighter immigration policy 
because, in general, I think it is more humane more consis 
tent with the preservation of and respect for human 
rights to control jobs rather than to control people.
I also think that the immigration debate tends to become 
entangled in feelings of xenophobia and racism, which 
obscure the underlying economic interest at stake. As a 
result, we are systematically led to pass legislation, which 
when we see what its true economic costs are, we are unwill 
ing to enforce. A debate which focuses on the minimum 
wage and labor standards legislation makes these costs much 
more salient in the public policy debate. I take it as axiomatic 
that if we are unwilling to support legislation which directly 
raises the cost of labor we will be unwilling to enforce im 
migration legislation which has the effect of doing this in 
directly by removing the foreign labor force. It is a consistent 
part of this policy not only to enforce labor standards direct 
ly, but also to combine that kind of enforcement with en 
forcement of immigration legislation through periodic in-
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spection of establishments known to employ clandestine im 
migrants so as to regularly vacate the jobs, open them up to 
nationals and test their desirability. The decent way to do 
this would be to inspect worker documents and inform the 
employer of all employees without proper documents and to 
hold the employer liable if he continues to hire these people 
in the future.
Do Not Use Immigration Reform to Solve Basic Economic 
and Social Problems: On the other hand, it would be a great 
mistake to see in the control of immigration a solution to any 
of our basic economic and social problems. This seems ob 
vious to me with respect to the high levels of unemployment 
we are currently experiencing, although, given the rhetoric 
surrounding the policy debate, this point is perhaps worth 
emphasizing. Current unemployment is the product of a 
deep and prolonged economic recession combined with long- 
term structural adjustments in the technology and interna 
tional competitive position of our major industries. The in 
creases in unemployment have concentrated among precisely 
those committed adult male workers who are not in competi 
tion with immigrants. And the low-wage, unstable, menial 
jobs which the immigrants hold will not substitute for the 
jobs these people have lost. The immigrant jobs might, it is 
true, ease the adjustment process of the displaced workers if 
they were willing to take them, but few of the displaced 
workers are going to be willing to accept the humiliation of 
such a major decline in social status for the small income in 
volved. The real solution to their problems will require both 
an economic recovery that is sustained and long lasting and 
training and relocation assistance to help permanently 
displaced workers find a dignified place within the economy.
I think it is worth emphasizing that the immigrants only 
accept these jobs because they think of them as temporary 
and because they hold them in a place so remote from the 
place in which they actually think of themselves as per-
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manently located and in which their own self-identity is an 
chored. A similar point can be made with respect to black 
youth. A number of the jobs now held by immigrants were 
once held by the black nationals. If the immigrants were to 
somehow disappear, black Americans would again take over 
some of their work. The immigrants, however, did not 
displace blacks. Employers perceived a change in black at 
titudes toward the work which made them difficult to 
manage, and recruited migrants to replace them. Black at 
titudes changed because an older generation, raised in the 
rural south with a background and motivations similar to the 
immigrants of today, was replaced by a new generation who 
grew up in northern urban areas. These younger workers 
associated the jobs with the inferior social status to which 
their race had been condemned in the United States and 
feared that they would be confined in them permanently 
through prejudice and discrimination. This process of 
replacement occurred almost 20 years ago in a much tighter 
labor market and at a time when both the political climate 
and the levels of welfare and social benefits were much more 
conducive to these attitudes than they are today. It is likely 
that black resistance to such work has moderated somewhat 
and this is the case for pressing to reopen some of these jobs. 
But, neither I nor, more important, the businessmen involv 
ed believe that the attitudes have changed substantially. The 
real solution to the employment problem of blacks requires 
not the regaining of menial, low-wage jobs, but upward 
mobility into high-wage, dignified work.
Do Not Interfere Directly with the Settlement of Im 
migrant Communities: Finally, precisely because of the ex 
perience with the black revolt in the 1960s, it would be a 
great mistake to attempt to control immigration by directly 
forestalling settlement. The black movement was essentially 
the revolt of second generation immigrants a revolt of the 
children of a generation who had come out of the south who
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were no longer satisfied with their parents' jobs, but who did 
not have access to the high wages and career advancement 
which might have satisfied their aspirations. Prejudice and 
discrimination were undoubtedly major factors blocking 
their advancement, but the black youth of the 1960s were 
also poorly trained for the positions to which they aspired. 
The children of the new immigrants will undoubtedly view 
their parents' jobs in much the same way and may react in 
much the same way if their own advancement is similarly 
blocked. Any attempt to prevent their parents from settling 
permanently will bar the children access to the educational 
and cultural facilities which will enable them to fulfill their 
aspirations and recreate for another major portion of our 
population the social tensions which have surrounded black 
communities in the last 20 years.
In a sense, moreover, American society has a moral 
obligation to these children as well. They are here because we 
wanted the labor of their parents. In a very real sense, we 
recruited their parents. By so doing we made the children like 
us, probably more like us in terms of values and aspirations, 
culture and language, than their parents. Having done so, we 
have an obligation to treat them as we would treat our own 
children. If, in the process, we create competitors for our 
children, this may be an argument for more careful control 
of the use of immigrant labor in the secondary sector, but is 
is not a very strong argument for limiting the after effects of 
that immigration by pressing on the children who, like us, 
have nowhere else to go.
Conclusions
Rejection of the conventional policy alternatives need not 
imply that we accept the settlement of immigrants as in 
evitable and beyond our control. To the contrary, the im 
migration process can be limited by a variety of means. 
Higher wages in the secondary sector would attract nationals
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to jobs generally held by immigrants and thus make un 
necessary the active recruitment of workers from abroad. 
Demand for immigrants on the part of employers is an im 
portant explanation for the continued stock of un 
documented workers. Furthermore, increased wages would 
enable temporary immigrants to meet their target earnings 
more rapidly and return home before they develop perma 
nent attachments in the United States. The longer the 
residence of the immigrant the more likely he or she will 
develop attachments and hence the more likely temporary 
residency will become permanent.
Changing the current visa policy may reduce permanent 
immigration. Time limitations on visitors in the form of 
visas, paradoxically, encourage longer stays and cause many 
visitors to remain permanently, albeit illegally, in the United 
States. This results because visa violators delay returning 
home when their visas expire for fear they will not be permit 
ted entry into the United States again. Replacing temporary 
visas with permanent visas could reduce permanent settle 
ment by permitting visitors to return home without fear of 
being barred from entering the United States in the future.
Higher wages and altered visa policies are all a good deal 
more humane and less costly than the policies contemplated 
in the current legislative debate. I believe these will ultimate 
ly be more effective in preserving the economic and spiritual 
values of American life.
NOTES
1. For a discussion about the derivation of these estimates see Corwin 
(1984).
2. For extensive discussion about the motives of immigrants see Piore 
(1979).
3. Immigration Commission (1911), p. 182, Table 16.
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4. For a discussion about these perceptions see Piore (1969).
5. For a discussion and citations see Piore (1979).
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"Its death is a classic symptom of the problem with our 
politics; the special interest prevails over the general 
interest." 1 With this epitaph, one member of the congres 
sional conference committee summed up the fate of the im 
migration reform package that died within his committee in 
October 1984. The bill under consideration was popularly 
known as the Simpson-Mazzoli bill. It represented the latest 
unsuccessful effort by Congress of a quest that began in the 
early 1970s to come to grips with the nation's outmoded and 
out-of-control immigration system. 2
The Simpson-Mazzoli bill was not a panacea for the na 
tion's immigration ills. It represented only the first step of 
what eventually must be a series of legislative moves to 
assure that the immigration system contributes to the 
nation's economic welfare and does not contravene such 
goals. For although the Simpson-Mazzoli bill did contain 
other features, it primarily addressed illegal immigration. As 
important as is this issue, it is a fundamental mistake to 
assume that abuse of the existing system is the only problem 
with the nation's immigration system. To the contrary, the 
nation's immigration system is in need of a complete 
overhaul. Massive illegal immigration is only the most ob 
vious symptom that something is wrong.
It was the original intention of this paper to discuss why 
the Simpson-Mazzoli bill was only the first and not the final
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step in the immigration reform process. The defeat of this 
bill which, incidentally, the noted authority on immigra 
tion history, Oscar Handlin, has correctly called "a more 
liberal measure than any we've had in 90 years" 3 means 
that the reform movement is back to square one. Hence, it is 
not yet possible to speak only about the agenda that lies 
"beyond Simpson-Mazzoli." The whole issue of immigra 
tion reform still remains to be again addressed.
The Issue in Brief Perspective
There are only two ways for a nation to acquire its labor 
force: people are born within its boundaries or they im 
migrate from other nations. Throughout most of the 19th 
and early 20th centuries, immigration was the most impor 
tant component of the nation's human resource policy. The 
imposition of the nation's first numerical ceilings on im 
migration in the 1920s was followed by several decades of 
depression, war, and their immediate aftermaths. As a con 
sequence, immigration diminished significantly in terms of 
its human resource importance from the early 1920s to the 
early 1960s. Because of this diminished role over this forty 
year period, many scholars and policymakers have been slow 
to recognize that since the mid-1960s, immigration in all of 
its diverse forms has again become a major feature of the 
U.S. economy. The 1980 Census revealed that since 1970, the 
number of foreign-born Americans had increased sharply 
after declining each previous decade since 1920 and it 
disclosed that one of every 10 people in the country reported 
speaking a language other than English at home. As there 
was a substantial statistical undercount of the illegal im 
migration population, it is certain that the dramatic findings 
of the size of the foreign-born population in 1980 are 
significantly understated. Noting the developments, Leon 
Bouvier observed in 1981 that "immigration now appears to
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be almost as important as fertility insofar as U.S. population 
growth is concerned." 4 As the labor force is the principal 
means by which population changes are transmitted to the 
nation's economy, Bouvier warned that "there is a compell 
ing argument for close co-ordination between the formula 
tion of employment and immigration policy." 5 Recognition 
of this critical linkage is the basis for the drive for immigra 
tion reform in the 1980s.
The Ability of Policy to Affect 
Labor Force Trends
The preponderance of factors that influence labor force 
trends within an economy are beyond the realm of 
policymakers to influence, even if they want to do so. Labor 
market research has repeatedly shown, for instance, that 
race and gender can influence employment and income ex 
periences of the labor force. As the number and proportion 
of minorities and women have increased in the labor force, 
there is nothing that human resource policymakers can do to 
change these trends. They can only respond with adjustment 
policies designed to influence the factors that cause these 
outcome differentials to occur. The same can be said for 
demographic changes in the age distribution of the labor 
force, the shift in social values that have contributed to the 
dramatic increase in female labor force participation, or the 
effects of the pace and scope of technological change on the 
preparation of workers for jobs. The control of immigration 
flows, however, is considered to be an exercise in the use of 
the discretionary powers of the state. As such, it is one 
dimension of a nation's human resource policy that should 
be capable of directive action rather than forced reaction.
Immigration has economic implications for the par 
ticipants and for the receiving society. It can determine labor 
force trends as well as respond to them. For this reason, the
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efficacy of policies that regulate immigration must be judged 
in terms of how they have related to broader labor force 
trends at any particular time. As will soon be apparent, this 
is decidedly not the case in the United States as of the 
mid-1980s.
The Influence of Administrative Structure
Because the magnitude and composition of immigration 
flows are supposedly subject to direct regulation by human 
institutions, it is essential to understand how the policymak- 
ing process functions. There is only tangential mention of 
immigration in the Constitution. By the late nineteenth cen 
tury, however, the Supreme Court had concluded that the 
federal government was the exclusive governmental body to 
assume this responsibility. 6 After a brief assignment of 
power to the Department of the Treasury and later to the 
Department of Commerce and Labor, the administration of 
immigration policy was shifted to the newly established U.S. 
Department of Labor (DOL) in 1914. This action 
represented a clear recognition by policymakers of the time 
that labor market considerations should be a primary con 
cern in the administration of immigration policy. In 1933, by 
executive order, the immigration and the naturalization 
functions (which had been separately administered in DOL) 
were joined into one agency the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS). The INS has continued every 
since to be responsible for the implementation of immigra 
tion policy.
With the recognition in 1940 of the likely involvement of 
the United States in World War II, a critical decision was 
made that has had lasting influence on the course of im 
migration policy. In June 1940, the INS was shifted from 
DOL to the U.S. Department of Justice. Ostensibly, the shift 
was necessary for national security reasons. It was believed
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that rapidly changing international events dictated a more ef 
fective means of control over immigrants and nonim 
migrants. Concern over the entry and presence of subversive 
foreign elements in the population was elevated to the 
highest priority mission of the agency. Labor market con 
siderations the historic concern were shunted aside.
When the war ended, the INS remained in the Department 
of Justice. The long-run effects of this administrative change 
have been disastrous to efforts to build a coherent immigra 
tion policy especially if one of the concerns is that im 
migration policy should be congruent with domestic labor 
force trends. The Department of Justice has multiple respon 
sibilities and, when compared to its numerous other impor 
tant duties, immigration matters have tended to be neglected 
or relegated to a low order of priority. Moreover, the 
Department of Justice is one of the most politically sensitive 
agencies in the federal government. It has often opted for the 
short-run expedient solutions for immigration issues. It has 
seldom manifested any interest in the economic aspects and 
consequences of immigration.
Another lasting effect of the shift of immigration policy to 
the Justice Department has been that the two judiciary com 
mittees of Congress gained the responsibility for supervision 
over immigration in general and the INS in particular. Tradi 
tionally, membership on these committees has been reserved 
(often exclusively) for lawyers. The result, as noted by David 
North and Alien LeBel, is that "as immigration problems 
arise, be they major or minor, perceived or real, the response 
of lawyer-legislators is that the law should be changed." 7 As 
a consequence, immigration law in the United States has 
become extremely complex and legalistic. In addition to 
these laws, it is also the case that INS operations are govern 
ed by more than 5,000 pages of written rules. Over the years, 
the labor market implications of immigration policy have
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either been ignored or given only superficial attention by the 
INS.
The Nature of the Existing Immigration System
Before discussing the reform of the extant immigration 
system, it is necessary to outline briefly what is the current 
system. To do this, it is necessary to look at the major policy 
components those that pertain to legal immigration, 
refugees, asylees, and illegal immigration. For the sake of 
brevity, I am not going to discuss the complex topics of 
nonimmigrant labor policy or of border commuter labor 
policy which are also part of this system and are also in dire 
need of reform.
Legal Immigration Policy
The revival of legal immigration as an influential force can 
be virtually dated to the passage of the Immigration Act of 
1965. It represented the culmination of decades of efforts to 
purge the nation's immigration system of the overt racism 
that had been the central focus of the "national origins 
system" adopted in 1924. After years of active struggle, the 
Civil Rights movement achieved its capstone goal the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Just as overt racism 
could not longer be tolerated in the way citizens were treated 
by fellow citizens, neither could racism be practiced by the 
laws that govern the way in which noncitizens were con 
sidered for immigrant admission.
The restrictive features of the "national origins system" 
had done more than shape the racial and ethnic composition 
of immigrant flows. It had sharply distorted the total flow of 
immigrants. Some nations with large quotas (e.g., Great Bri 
tain, which was entitled to about 40 percent of all of the 
available visas) did not use all of the slots available to it while
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other nations with small quotas (e.g., Italy and Greece) had 
massive backlogs of would-be immigrants. Hence, during 
the years 1952 to 1965, for example, only 61 percent of the 
available quotas were actually used, despite the fact that tens 
of thousands of persons were precluded from admission 
because they came from the "wrong" country. Succeeding 
administrations in the post-World War II era were forced, 
therefore, to seek ad hoc legislation and to use parole powers 
given to the Attorney General to admit hundreds of 
thousands of refugees for both humanitarian and national 
interest considerations. As a consequence, one of every three 
persons admitted to the United States from 1952 to 1965 
entered outside the terms of the prevailing immigration 
system. Hence, because the system was outdated by the pro 
gression of both world and domestic events, the Immigration 
Act of 1965 was adopted.
It is important to note that while the changes enacted in 
1965 significantly altered the character of the existing 
system, the reform movement could not entirely escape the 
heavy hand of the past. Thus, while overt racism was 
eliminated in 1965, the new act elevated family reunification 
to the role of being the dominant admission factor. On the 
surface this might seem to be a humane feature, but the 
motivation for the change was far less noble. The change was 
made in the judiciary committee of the House of Represen 
tatives where some congressional supporters were more con 
cerned with finding a way to retain the national origins 
system under a covert guise. Obviously, if certain groups had 
been excluded or had a low quota in the past, they would 
have had fewer chances to have relatives who could use their 
presence as a means to admit new immigrants. Thus, reliance 
on family unification would largely benefit those groups who 
had large quotas under the older system. The Johnson ad 
ministration opposed this move. It sought to retain both the 
priority and the emphasis of labor market considerations as
50 Immigration Reform
the highest preference criterion (which had been the case 
since the use of a preference system to determine immigrant 
priorities was formally established in 1952). Congress, 
however, made family reunification the dominant admission 
factor. The Johnson administration was forced to accept the 
change as the price of getting rid of the national origins ad 
mission system. Labor market considerations were 
downgraded to both lower preferences and to a sharply 
reduced number of visa allotments. The ostensible reasons 
for the reversal or priorities was that during the era when 
labor market factors dominated, the system had not used all 
of the available slots. But as already noted, the reason for 
the inability to use all of the available slots between 1952-65 
was the distortion imposed by the "national origins 
system" not the concept of labor force priority itself.
In the years since 1965, there have been a number of minor 
changes in the immigration system but they have retained 
this focus on family reunification. The system as of early 
1984 sets a single worldwide admission ceiling of 270,000 
visas to be issued each year. No more than 20,000 visas are to 
be allotted to the would-be immigrants of any one country. 
The "immediate relatives" of each visa holder, however, are 
not counted in either ceiling. Immediate relatives are 
spouses, children, and parents of U.S. citizens over age 21. 
To decide which specific individuals are to be granted such a 
visa within the framework of these numerical ceilings, a six- 
category preference system exists. The categories rank the 
preferences in order with a certain proportion of the total 
visas reserved for each preference. Four of the categories 
(which account for 80 percent of the visas) are reserved for 
persons who are family-related. Thus, family reunification 
has, since 1965, become the mainstay of the legal immigra 
tion system. The two remaining admission categories are 
based on labor market principles. They account for the re 
maining 20 percent of the available visas each year. For these
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two labor market categories, a person must secure a cer 
tification from the Department of Labor that states that the 
presence of the immigrant will not adversely affect the job 
opportunities and prevailing labor force standards of citizen 
workers. In addition to the preference categories, Congress 
has established 33 separate classes of people who are 
specifically excluded from being admitted (e.g., paupers, 
prostitutes, Nazis, communists, fascists, homosexuals, etc.) 
no matter if they would otherwise be eligible to be an im 
migrant.
It should also be noted that between 1965 and 1980, a 
separate preference group existed for refugees with 17,400 
slots. Over that interval, however, the actual number of 
refugee admissions greatly exceeded this ceiling. (Excluding 
Vietnamese refugees, it averaged about 50,000 persons a 
year.) The excesses were admitted through the use of the 
parole authority given to the Attorney General to admit per 
sons for "emergent reasons." Because the use of the parole 
powers was finally admitted to be what it was a means of 
circumventing the existing immigration statutes, refugees 
were removed from the established immigration system in 
1980. With the Refugee Act of 1980, they are admitted under 
a separate procedure. Since 1982, the President arbitrarily 
sets the number of refugees to be admitted in advance of 
each fiscal year. He then must consult with Congress over 
the appropriateness of the suggested figure. The number of 
refugees approved for 1984, for instance, was 72,000 per 
sons. Obviously, there are no labor market considerations 
applied to the entry eligibility of refugees.
The Refugee Act of 1980 also created an asylee policy for 
the United States. As opposed to a refugee (who is a person 
living outside of his or her home nation and who fears 
persecution if forced to return but who is not presently in the 
United States), an asylee is a person who also fears similar
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persecution if he or she returns to his or her homeland but is 
already physically present in the United States. The Refugee 
Act of 1980 authorized up to 5,000 asylee admissions a year. 
As of early 1984, there were over 173,000 asylee requests 
pending approval and it is likely that this number will con 
tinue to grow. As with refugees, there are no labor market 
considerations applied to asylees.
Having discussed the "front door" approaches to the na 
tions labor market, it is necessary to add that there is a 
massive "back door" approach as well. Although the legal 
system is extremely complex in its objectives, the entire 
system can be easily circumvented by those who enter illegal 
ly. Unlike most other nations, there are no penalties on 
employers who hire illegal immigrants in the United States. 
Virtually all illegal immigrants who are caught are given a 
"voluntary departure" back to their homeland. Hence, there 
is virtually no deterrence associated with the violation of the 
existing system. There is no system of work permits or of na 
tional identification and those forms of identification that 
are available are easily counterfeitable. Moreover, the INS 
has always been chronically understaffed and underfunded 
relative to the duties it is assigned.
All evidence indicates that most illegal immigrants come to 
the United States to find jobs not for purposes of securing 
welfare or for criminal purposes. No one, of course, knows 
the exact number of illegal immigrants who compose the 
stock of the illegal immigrant population or the annual flow. 
In its final report in 1981, the Select Commission on Im 
migration and Refugee Policy cited a range of from 3.5 to 6 
million illegal immigrants. Their estimate, however, was bas 
ed upon a review provided by the Census Bureau of a variety 
of previous studies done in the early and mid-1970s. Thus, 
whatever the validity of the estimate included in the Select 
Commission's report, it should be understood that it was
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based on the averaging of data for the mid-1970s not the 
mid-1980s. Given the certainty that illegal immigration has 
increased since the mid-1970s, the stock and flows are no 
doubt greater now than those cited by the Commission's 
Report. In 1984, the INS apprehended 1,056,905 illegal im 
migrants. Many of these people were apprehended more 
than once. On the other hand, however, most illegal im 
migrants especially those from countries other than Mex 
ico are never caught. Hence, the magnitude of the stock 
and annual flows of illegal immigrants cannot be estimated 
with any degree of accuracy.
Labor Market Impacts of the Era 
of Renewed Immigration
There is a paucity of credible research on the precise 
employment experiences of all groups of post-1965 im 
migrants. There is no statistical data base to measure the 
labor force status of immigrants comparable to the informa 
tion compiled by the monthly Current Population Survey for 
all workers in the United States. All that are available are ad 
ministrative statistics the findings of a few ad hoc studies 
of immigrants, and information on the foreign-born popula 
tion supplied by the decennial census count. From these 
disparate sources, however, it is possible to discern some 
likely tendencies. An awareness of these tendencies and their 
logical conclusions is prerequisite to an understanding of the 
macro-economic effects of immigrantion to the nation.
The Immigrant Infusion to the Supply 
of Labor Has Increased
The annual flow of legal immigrants since 1965 has more 
than doubled the annual flow that existed for the period 1924 
to 1965. For the earlier period, the annual flow was 191,000 
immigrants and immediate relatives; for the period 1965 to
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1981, the number has increased to an annual average of 
435,000; for the years 1978 to 1981, it was 547,000. These 
figures do not include those refugees who have yet to adjust 
their status to become resident aliens, or those asylees whose 
status is still pending, or any illegal immigrants. If all flows 
are considered, it is likely that immigration in the 1980s is ac 
counting for as much as half of the annual growth in the 
population and probably an even greater percentage of the 
real growth of the labor force. 8
The Size of the Annual Flow of Immigrants Has No Regard 
for Domestic Labor Market Conditions
The aggregate number of immigrants and immediate 
relatives admitted each year is completely independent of the 
prevailing labor market conditions. The number of im 
migrants annually admitted has in no way been influenced by 
the tightness or looseness of the domestic labor market. If 
allowance is also made for refugees admitted since 1965 and 
for the tide of illegal immigrants that have entered over this 
same period, immigration has steadily added substantial 
numbers of additional workers, regardless of the cyclical 
ability of the economy to provide sufficient jobs for citizen 
or immigrant workers. This practice is at total variance with 
the practice of most of the handful of other countries that 
have been admitting immigrants over this same period.
Immigrants Have a Higher 
Labor Force Participation Rate
The few studies that have focused upon labor force par 
ticipation of immigrants reveal that the majority of im 
migrants over age 16 do enter the labor force. Indeed, they 
show that the actual labor force participation rate for legal 
immigrants and their immediate relative is likely to be con 
siderably not marginally higher than that of the general 
population. 9
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There is no such data, of course, for illegal immigrants but 
it is intuitively obvious that their labor force participation 
rates are higher than those of legal immigrants. Illegal im 
migrants are primarily job seekers. They are legislatively in 
eligible for many of the transfer programs that might pro 
vide alternative income sources. The case with refugees, 
however, is not quite so clear. Refugees prior to the 1970s 
seem to have had a relatively easier adjustment process to 
labor force entry than have large infusions of refugees from 
Southeast Asia that have occurred since the mid-1970s. 
Refugees have been eligible not only for federal income 
transfer programs but also for local and state programs that 
are available to citizens.
Immigration Supplies Workers Independent of the 
Macro Human Resource Needs of the Economy
An overwhelming proportion of those persons who have 
immigrated to the United States have been admitted without 
regard to their skill, education, or geographic settlement 
preferences. As noted earlier, 80 percent of the persons who 
receive visas to immigrate are admitted because the immigra 
tion system gives preference to family reunification prin 
ciples. Immediate relatives of all immigrants are admitted 
regardless of their labor force credentials, as are all refugees 
and all would-be asylees. This is not meant to imply that 
those who are admitted under these procedures lack talents 
but rather, as David North and Alien LeBel have observed, 
they "do so accidently." 10 Accordingly it is estimated that 
only about 5 percent of all those persons admitted to the 
United States each year are required to have labor certifica 
tions that indicate they are filling established labor force 
needs. If illegal immigrants are included, of course, this 
small percentage of certified workers would be reduced to an 
infinitesimal number compared to the total flow of im 
migrant workers.
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The Immigrant Flow is Predominately Composed 
of Members of Minority Groups
The most important qualitative change in the personal 
characteristics of immigrants that has occurred since the end 
of the national origins system has been the complete shift in 
the regions of origin of the immigrants. Almost 80 percent of 
the immigrants and refugees admitted during the 1970s were 
from Latin America and Asia. In the 1980s, the percentage is 
even higher (close to 84 percent). Beginning with the decade 
of the 1960s, Europe was replaced for the first time in the na 
tion's history by Latin America as the leading source of im 
migrants. By the 1970s, Asia which was not free from the 
discriminatory features of the previous immigration system, 
was challenging Latin America for that distinction.
The last time that a European nation was among the top 
five of the countries that supply immigrants to the United 
States was in 1973 (when Italy placed fifth). Mexico has 
become the country that annually supplies the most im 
migrants; the Philippine Islands have tended to be the 
runner-up. The other sources vary from year to year but, 
since 1974, they have all been located in either Asia or the 
Caribbean area.
The predominance of immigrants from Latin America and 
the Caribbean area can be easily explained in terms of the 
priority given to family reunification in the admissions 
system. For Asians, the explanation is more complex. It 
would seem that the family reunification system should have 
worked against many Asian groups, given the exclusionary 
features that were in effect for much of the pre-1965 era. The 
answer to this paradox is the fact that Asians have made 
astute use of the occupational preferences as well as the fact 
that they have overwhelmingly dominated the massive 
refugee flows for each year since the mid-1970s. In the first 
case, the Asian immigrants have tended to be skilled and
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highly educated; in the latter instance, they have usually been 
unskilled and poorly educated.
Likewise, the illegal immigrant flows have also come 
predominately from Mexico and the Caribbean area. The 
best approximations are that about 60 percent of the illegal 
immigrants to the United States come from Mexico and 
about 20 percent come from other countries of the Carib 
bean area. The remaining 20 percent come from other na 
tions of the world.
Without doubt, therefore, the combined immigrant flows 
are overwhelmingly composed of persons from minority 
groups (Hispanics, blacks, and Asians). As will be discussed 
later, there is a strong clustering pattern of these immigrants 
into local labor markets of the central cities of a few large 
states that are already composed of persons from similar 
racial and ethnic backgrounds. As a result, it is very likely 
that many immigrants compete directly with other citizen 
minority workers for available jobs. The competition is most 
likely to be most adverse in the lower skilled occupations. 
For the higher skilled legal immigrants, the competition for 
employment opportunities is more broadly based and, 
accordingly, the impact is less severe.
It is likely, therefore, that since 1965, immigration in 
general but illegal immigration and refugee flows in par 
ticular has tended to adversely affect the employment, 
unemployment and labor force participation rates of minori 
ty citizens. The geographical concentration of immigrants in 
a few large metropolitan areas has also tended to moderate 
wage increases for all workers who compete with them in 
these same labor markets in general but with minority group 
citizens in particular.'' To the degree this has happened, un 
controlled immigration has worked at cross purposes with 
other federal human resource policies that have been in 
itiated over these same years that have been designed prin-
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cipally to improve the economic opportunity for these same 
minority citizen groups.
The Occupational Patterns of Immigrants Differ 
Extensively From Those of the Labor Force as a Whole
With specific reference to the occupational patterns of im 
migrants, the occupational distribution of those admitted as 
legal immigrants is skewed toward professional, technical, 
and skilled workers. The pattern is due largely to the fact 
that the complex admission system is biased toward those 
who have family connections as well as the time and the 
money that it takes to work their way through the labyrinth 
of the legal immigration system. For the minority who are 
admitted under the two occupational preferences and who, 
by virtual definition do not have family relatives who are 
citizens, the two occupational preferences generally favor 
those with high skills and extensive educational 
backgrounds. Persons who are likely to become "public 
charges," for instance, are specifically excluded from 
becoming legal immigrants. Furthermore, because of the ex 
tensive backlog of visa applications (over 1.2 million visa ap 
plications were pending at the end of 1982), there have been 
no visas available since 1978 for the nonpreference "catch 
all" category that theoretically exists. Thus, it is not surpris 
ing that the occupational characteristics are skewed dif 
ferently from the distribution of the labor force as a whole.
It appears from studies by David North of a cohort of 
1970 immigrants and a study by Barry Chiswick of the 
foreign-born who entered the U.S. up to 1970, that the earn 
ings of immigrants tend to be initially below those of citizen 
workers in comparable occupations but that these dif 
ferences gradually vanish in 11 to 15 years. 12 Chiswick, in 
fact, found that male immigrants actually end up doing bet 
ter than citizen workers in comparable occupations after
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about 20 years in the country. He was unable to make con 
clusive findings about female immigrants. It is of conse 
quence to note that Chiswick found that immigrants from 
Mexico and the Philippines (the two countries that have been 
the largest sources of legal immigrants since 1962) took a 
longer time to sustain these results.
In reviewing, Chiswick's ambitious research on this sub 
ject, it is vital to keep in mind that his analysis is of all 
foreign-born who had entered the United States prior to 
1970. It has been after 1970, however, that the full effects of 
the Immigration Act of 1965 and the Refugee Act of 1980 
have occurred. As North has noted, the 1970 Census data on 
the foreign-born "is a group composed of persons of above 
average age, most of whom came to the U.S. many years 
earlier and under provisions of earlier legislation." 13 As a 
consequence he warns about the use of this data as a 
reference group since "one must not assume that the profile 
of the foreign-born which emerged from the 1970 Census 
will be similar to that emerging from the 1980 or 1990 Cen 
suses.'
Likewise, the sizeable increases in the number of illegal 
immigrants since the 1960s especially those from Mexico 
and the Caribbean Basin have been dominated by low- 
skilled and unskilled workers, which also challenges any 
complacent deductions that would seem to be the logical 
conclusions of some of the existing literature. In Chiswick's 
work, for instance, there is no way to separate the experience 
of legal immigrants from illegal immigrants since he is study 
ing the foreign-born as reported by the Census. It is certain 
that the illegal immigrant population is severely under- 
counted in the Census and, accordingly, it is likely that their 
experiences are not adequately captured by this data base.
One study that has made use of the 1980 Census and its 
data on the foreign-born, done by Gregory DeFreitas and
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Adriana Marshall found that over one-third of all im 
migrants were employed in manufacturing (compared to 23 
percent of native-born workers). 15 In many metropolitan 
areas, the concentration was more severe 75 percent of all 
manufacturing workers in Miami were immigrants; over 40 
percent of those in Los Angeles and New York City; 25 per 
cent in San Francisco; and 20 percent in Chicago and 
Boston. In 35 metropolitan areas with a population of one 
million or more, immigrants comprised 19 percent of all pro 
duction jobs in manufacturing. Not surprisingly, given the 
occupational, industrial and geographic concentration of the 
immigrant work force, the study found that the rate of wage 
growth in manufacturing was inversely related to the size of 
the immigrant population in those metropolitan areas. The 
high concentration of foreign-born workers had a statistical 
ly significant negative impact on wage growth compared to 
the experience with large metropolitan areas with lower 
percentages of foreign-born workers.
Given that the illegal immigrant flows into the labor force 
since 1965 are likely to have matched and probably exceeded 
the legal flows, it is essential that the labor market ex 
periences of illegal immigrants be specifically included in any 
effort to assess the overall impact of immigrants on the labor 
market. There are only two studies that have been able to 
make a serious attempt to capture some measure of these 
patterns. One was a nationwide study made of apprehended 
illegal immigrants by David North and Marion Houstoun in 
1976. 16 The second was a study made of unapprehended il 
legal immigrants in Los Angeles in 1979 by a research team 
from the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA). 17 
Both studies were funded by the U.S. Department of Labor. 
In the North and Houstoun study, the respondents had been 
in the United States for an average of 2.5 years while in the 
UCLA study the mean was 4.0 years.
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The occupational patterns of the respondents in the two 
studies showed conclusively that illegal immigrants are con 
centrated in the unskilled occupations of farm workers, ser 
vice workers, nonfarm laborers as well as the semi-skilled 
blue-collar occupations of operatives. A significant number 
are also in the skilled blue-collar occupation of craft 
workers. Very few were found in any white-collar occupa 
tion.
A comparison of the data from these two studies shows 
that the occupational patterns of illegal immigrants closely 
resembles those of Mexican Americans (Chicanos) and of 
blacks. The employment pattern of Chicanos, in fact, better 
resembles the pattern of illegal immigrants than it does the 
general distribution pattern of the overall labor force.
It seems certain that the illegal immigrant workers are con 
centrated in the secondary labor market of the U.S. economy 
where they often compete with the millions of citizen 
workers who also are working and seek work in this sector. 
Indeed, Malcolm Lovell, the Under Secretary of Labor, in 
his testimony to Congress in support of immigration reform, 
stated that "in 1981, close to 30 percent of all workers 
employed in this country, some 29 million people, were 
holding down the same kind of low-skilled industrial, ser 
vice, and farm jobs in which illegals typically find employ 
ment." 18
Illegal immigrants are by no means the only cause of 
unemployment and persistent low income patterns among 
certain subgroups of the American labor force but they cer 
tainly are one factor. The formulation of any serious full 
employment strategy for the United States in the 1980s, 
therefore, will have to include measures to curtail illegal im 
migration.
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Thus, it would appear that the occupational impact of 
legal immigrants is at the upper end of the nation's occupa 
tional structure while the impact of illegal immigrants is at 
the lower end. Studies that combine these two groups to ob 
tain an average measure of the experience of immigrants on 
the labor force miss the actual significance of the real im 
pact.
The Locational Impact of Immigrants 
is Extremely Unequal
One of the most pronounced effects of the unguided im 
migration system is that legal immigrants are highly concen 
trated into a relatively few major labor markets. Since 1966, 
California and New York have consistently accounted for 
almost half of the intended residences of all legal im 
migrants. Texas, Florida, New Jersey and Illinois account 
for about one-quarter of the intended settlement destina 
tions. Thus, six states have received almost three-quarters of 
all of the legal immigrants. Data from the 1980 Census also 
confirm this high concentration rate of the total foreign- 
born population in these same states (the percentage of 
foreign-born in California was 14.8 percent, New York 13.4 
percent, New Jersey 10.3, Florida 10.9, Illinois 7.3 and 
Texas 6.0; the only other state with a large foreign-born 
population was Hawaii with 14.0 percent). 19
Within the states in which they settle, legal immigrants 
have demonstrated a consistent preference in the 1970s for 
the large central cities. 20 Although the exact percentage 
varies each year, a central city was the destination of about 
55 percent of the immigrants who were admitted between 
1960 and 1979. Urban areas those with a population of be 
tween 2,500 to 99,000 people were the clear second choices 
while rural areas were a distant last. These initial residential 
patterns differ distinctly from those of the general popula-
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tion in which urban areas have become the overwhelming 
first choice since 1960 (accounting for almost half of the 
population) followed by an almost equal preference (of 
about 25 percent each) for central cities and rural areas.
The 1980 Census information on the foreign-born popula 
tion vividly demonstrates the effect that immigration is hav 
ing on the population of a few large metropolitan areas. In 
1980, for instance, the metropolitan area with the highest 
percentage of its population being foreign-born was Miami, 
with a phenomenal percentage of 35.2 percent. The second 
highest was Los Angeles (21.6 percent) and the third was 
New York City (20.8 percent). Thus, the necessity to accom 
modate the growing immigrant flow has not fallen evenly. 
Only a few states and a handful of cities have borne the 
brunt of the revival of immigration that has occurred since 
1965. As the aforementioned DeFreitas and Marshall study 
found, one effect of the disproportionate concentrations has 
been to retard wage growth in these large metropolitan areas 
relative to other metropolitan areas with fewer immigrant 
workers. It is also of consequence to note that the settlement 
pattern of illegal immigrants has closely resembled the loca- 
tional preferences of legal immigrants. In their quest to 
avoid detection, illegal immigrants often seek to blend into 
communities that already have large numbers of persons 
from similar ethnic backgrounds. This tendency, of course, 
only intensifies the pressures on these few states and cities to 
accommodate immigrants.
Thus, the uneven distribution of immigrants means that 
studies that focus on the national or state level miss the ac 
tual impact of immigration at the local level in the com 
munities of only a handful of states. But when one 
recognizes that those central cities in these few states account 
for a significant portion of the total employment in the na 
tion, there is no reason to consider these impacts as inconse 
quential to the economy as a whole.
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In the Short Run, It is Likely that Immigrants 
Contribute to Higher Unemployment Rates
Chiswick has found for the foreign-born males that it 
takes about five years for them to reach the same number of 
weeks worked and to come down to the same number of 
weeks of unemployment as native-born men. 21 This would 
suggest that in the short run that immigrant males tend to ex 
perience a higher incidence of unemployment than is the 
general case. In his findings, it is also of importance to note 
that he also found that the foreign-born males from Mexico, 
Cuba, and China tended to take longer to reach parity with 
native-born men than it did the foreign-born men from other 
nations. All three of these countries have consistently ranked 
among the largest sources of legal immigrants and refugees 
since 1970. It is logical to conclude that, if anything, the 
unemployment experiences of the past decade should be less 
favorable than those that occurred prior to the 1970s.
Concluding Observations
The prevailing immigration policy of the United States 
was largely conceived in the early 1950s and the mid-1960s 
when immigration was not a particularly significant in 
fluence on the economy of the nation. As a consequence, the 
current immigration policy manifests a complete disinterest 
in its labor force implications. Perhaps the nation could con 
tinue to allow immigration policy to be excluded from any 
responsibility to contribute directly to the nation's economic 
welfare if the economy had not undergone significant 
changes and if the immigration flows of workers had remain 
ed relatively small. But this has not been the case. Hence, the 
"practice" of allowing immigration policy to continue to 
follow its own nepotistic, inflexible, mechanistic, and 
massively abused course is a "luxury" that this nation can ill 
afford to continue.
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The contemporary economy of the United States is a far 
cry from the one into which earlier waves of immigrants 
entered. The resurgence of immigration since 1965 has exact 
ly parallelled the period when the labor force of the United 
States has sustained unprecedented changes in both size and 
composition.
With regard to size, the civilian labor force increased by an 
average of 1.8 million workers each year from 1964 to 1973; 
and annually by 2.2 million from 1973 to 1980. Since then 
the rate of annual increase as officially measured (which 
means that it is doubtful if the full effects of growing 
numbers of illegal immigrants are included) has declined 
slightly. Nonetheless, in 1984 the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) announced that it is revising its long term projections 
of labor force growth from the period 1982 to 1990 to 1.6 
million net new workers each year. (I would argue that even 
this projection is conservative as all past projections by the 
BLS have been.)
As for the composition of the labor force, the period since 
1965 has been one in which racial and ethnic groups as well 
as women have dramatically increased their proportions of 
the total labor force. The BLS projects that these patterns 
will continue with women accounting for two-thirds of the 
annual growth in the labor force and blacks about 25 percent 
over the next decade. It is certain especially if immigration 
continues the pattern of the past that the Hispanic labor 
force will also increase its share disproportionately even 
though the BLS did not highlight this group in its projec 
tions.
With respect to the entire labor force, the next decade 
presents the nation with a unique situation. Because the 
"baby boom" generation has now come of age, it is pro 
jected that by 1990 the largest single age cohort of the 
population will be between the ages of 25 to 44 the prime
66 Immigration Reform
working age years. It is a period when labor force participa 
tion is at its highest for both males and females. During the 
late 1980s and early 1990s it is predicted that the majority (or 
more than half) of the total population of the U.S. will be 
participating in the labor force. By 1995, it is expected that 
70 percent of the labor force will be between 25 and 54 years 
of age. Thus, it is going to be a period in which there will be 
mounting pressure on the economy to generate additional 
employment opportunities especially for women and 
minorities. 22
Under these circumstances, it is clear that the last two 
decades of the twentieth century are going to be years in 
which the labor force of the nation will be confronted with 
immense pressures to accommodate both the growth in the 
number of job seekers as well as to changes in the composi 
tion of the supply of labor. The quest to meet these 
challenges will be difficult enough without being undermined 
by an immigration policy that is seemingly oblivious to its 
labor market impacts but which, in actuality, has influential 
labor market consequences.
The broad outlines of the policy reform needed to make 
immigration policy conform to the economic welfare of the 
nation are easy to list. With respect to the annual levels of 
immigration, there need to be enforceable ceilings. But they 
should be ceilings and not established and inflexible 
numbers. The actual number of immigrants admitted each 
year should be responsive to unemployment trends in the na 
tion. Annual immigration levels should fluctuate inversely 
with unemployment trends (as is the practice in Canada). 
The system should be capable of responding to changing 
economic circumstances. The boundary ceiling should be set 
by legislation but the precise levels in any given year should 
be set administratively. It is implicit, if this were to be done, 
that the administrative responsibilities for immigration
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policy should be shifted back to the U.S. Department of 
Labor (or some other new agency that might be created to 
administer and coordinate all of the nation's human resource 
development policies) and away from the U.S. Department 
of Justice and the judiciary committees of Congress.
In regard to the actual determination of who is admitted as 
a legal immigrant each year, the preference system should 
revert back to the primary emphasis on occupational 
preferences that characterized the system from 1952 to 1965. 
Family reunification should remain an admission criterion 
but not the primary factor, as has been the case since 1965. 
No other nation in the world allows such a nepotistic and 
discriminatory doctrine to dominate its admission system. 
The occupational preferences should be increased to at least 
the pre-1965 level of 50 percent of the available visas. Full 
discretion should be given to the administrative agency to 
decide which occupations (skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled) 
are in greatest need at any particular time and to admit them. 
Included within this discretionary power should be the right 
to give preference to immigrants willing to settle in regions 
where labor is scarce. The shift away from the dominance of 
family reunification would also allow opportunities for 
"new seed immigrants" (especially for immigrants from 
Africa, who have the most trouble competing under the ex 
isting system) to enter.
The refugee and asylee policies of the nation are the most 
difficult to integrate into a policy design that focuses on 
economic priorities. Obviously, the United States should 
continue to participate in the worldwide effort to absorb and 
to assist in the accommodation of refugees. But experience 
clearly indicates that there must be some limitations on the 
number of refugees that are to be admitted and where they 
are to be settled. A legislative ceiling should be set on the 
number of refugees to be admitted with the understanding
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that, if special circumstances do arise, more refugees may be 
admitted but that offsetting reductions will be made in the 
number of legal immigrants in the same or the following 
year. If a situation should develop that was truly extraor 
dinary, Congress could legislate a temporary increase in the 
numerical boundaries to accommodate such a unique cir 
cumstance. The asylee issue is presently too complex to 
discuss in this paper except to note that the current policy is 
hopelessly bogged down in a system of judicial paralysis. 
Currently, asylees are entitled to almost twice as many levels 
of appeals of their status as are provided to convicted 
murderers. It is essential that a more expedited system of 
reaching closure in these cases be designed. But the ultimate 
principle for admission should be the same as refugees: 
namely, if asylees permissions are granted, legal immigration 
should be reduced accordingly. It is essential that the princi 
ple of choice be firmly established in the operation of the na 
tion's immigration system. Otherwise, one is confronted 
with the chaos of the present system where the policy is 
essentially one that ratifies what has already happened 
anyway. Moreover, there is no sense establishing the concept 
that total immigrant flows should fluctuate with domestic 
labor market conditions if the entire process can be cir 
cumvented by flows from another source. There are already 
some signs that the refugee and asylee system is being used 
for purposes (such as economic betterment) other than those 
for which it was designed (i.e., to avoid persecution for one's 
political and personal views). 23 The full cost of assisting 
refugees and asylees to be prepared for entry into the labor 
market should be borne by the federal government and not 
by local communities.
All of the preceding suggestions, of course, are predicated 
on the assumption that a full-scale effort will be mounted to 
end the flow of illegal immigrants into the country. It would 
make no sense at all to attempt to construct a positive im-
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migration policy that works in tandem with general 
economic policy if the entire process can be easily cir 
cumvented. The appropriate policies should be designed to 
address both the "push" and the "pull" factors that con 
tribute to the illegal immigration process. They should in 
clude enhanced deterrent policies (e.g., employer sanctions, 
enhanced INS funding, and less reliance on the use of the 
voluntary departure system) as well as prevention measures 
(e.g., extensive economic and technical development 
assistance, trade and tariff concessions, and the absolute in 
sistence on the adherence to human rights principles and the 
protection of human life from murder and torture as a prere 
quisite for receipt of the economic aid and trade 
concessions).
The absence of any serious effort to forge an immigration 
policy based upon labor market considerations means that 
immigration policy today functions as a "wild card" among 
the nation's array of key labor market policies. Unlike all 
other elements of economic policy (e.g., fiscal policy, 
monetary policy, employment and training policy, education 
policy, and antidiscrimination policy) where attempts are 
made by policymakers to orchestrate the diverse policy 
elements into a harmony of action to accomplish particular 
objectives, immigration policy has been allowed to meander 
aimlessly. This is a situation that no sensible nation can 
allow to continue.
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The Illegal Men Policy Dilemma
Barry R. Chiswick 
University of Illinois at Chicago
Introduction
A lecture and seminar series on the Economics of Interna 
tional Migration, and a public lecture on illegal aliens, are 
very timely. As a research topic, immigration has long been 
the concern of historians and sociologists. It is only in recent 
years about a decade ago that economists returned to this 
topic.
Economists were concerned with the issue at the turn of 
the century and up to the early 1920s until the enactment of 
the "national origins" quota system. From then until the 
1960s, there was little public policy concern or debate over 
general immigration issues, and this is reflected by the virtual 
absence of interest in the subject by economists. The 1965 
Immigration Amendments abolished the "national origins" 
quota system and substituted a "preference system" which 
placed greatest emphasis on kinship with a U.S. citizen or 
resident alien. But this was done with surprising little public 
debate and with a continued virtual vacuum in the economic 
literature.
It was only in the 1970s that there was a renewed public 
policy interest in immigration issues. Although the policy in 
terest focused on illegal immigration, economic research 
took a broader approach, exploring all dimensions of im 
migrant adjustment and impact, for both legal and illegal 
aliens.
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After a decade of high energy prices, sharply fluctuating 
rates of economic growth, high and erratic rates of inflation, 
and increased concerns for the quality of the environment, 
there is now a greater realization that resources are limited 
and that continued economic growth is not a gift from the 
gods, but rather is dependent on a public policy that fosters 
rather than hinders economic growth. All public policy 
issues once thought outside the realm of economic thinking 
or economic considerations are coming under closer 
scrutiny, including immigration policy.
Economists have demonstrated that immigrant flows are, 
in part, the consequence of economic forces. They have also 
demonstrated that immigrants play an important and com 
plex role in the economy in general and in the labor market 
in particular. In addition, economists have demonstrated 
that immigrants impact on the well-being of the economy 
and the American population.
This lecture will be on the contradictions and dilemmas in 
herent in forming public policy toward illegal aliens. In so 
doing it will point to the direction of sounder policy solu 
tions.
The Illegal Alien Debate
The most recent public focus on immigration has been 
with respect to illegal aliens. From the last days of the Ford 
administration to the present, each session of Congress has 
given serious consideration to the enactment of legislation to 
grant amnesty to illegal aliens living in the U.S., to impose 
for the first time federal sanctions on employers of illegal 
aliens, and to strengthen enforcement at the border. In 1984 
both houses of Congress passed such legislation, by a large 
majority in the Senate and by a handful of votes in the 
House. Because of minor differences, the legislation went to 
a House/Senate conference committee where it died, in no
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small part because of the newly expressed opposition of both 
presidential candidates.
The persistence with which the legislation is brought for 
ward, the heated debate, the widely divergent support in the 
House and Senate, and the periodic changes in position of 
presidents and presidential candidates suggests that illegal 
aliens are a difficult policy issue.
Illegal aliens exist because workers are attracted to the 
United States by jobs provided by the economy and because 
there is an incomplete enforcement of immigration law by 
the government. They impact on the labor market by 
decreasing the earnings and employment opportunities of 
some U.S. workers and increasing them for other U.S. 
workers. The size of the illegal alien population is believed to 
be large and growing. It has recently been estimated by three 
Census Bureau statisticians that 3 to 6 million illegal aliens 
were residing in the United States in 1980 (Siegel, Passel and 
Robinson, 1981). It is also estimated that half of these illegal 
aliens are Mexican nationals. Every indication suggests that 
the continued deterioration of the Mexican economy and 
political upheavals in Central and South America will be fur 
ther spurs to illegal immigration.
Yet, we know surprisingly little about illegal aliens. Why is 
there such a large illegal alien population? Why is there so 
little research on the topic? Indeed, the Select Commission 
on Immigration and Refugee Policy, which issued its report 
in 1981, was established primarily to analyze policy regard 
ing illegal aliens and the Commission devoted most of its 
recommendations to this issue. Yet, it funded no research 
relating to the characteristics or impact of illegal aliens. Its 
research program played no apparent role in its policy deci 
sions.
There is a legislative stalemate in Washington. Too few 
resources are budgeted to enforcement for the Immigration
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and Naturalization Service (INS) to have any substantial im 
pact. Yet, there is an unwillingness to publicly acknowledge 
this "lack of will" and offer amnesty. This public am 
bivalence has been quite obvious for at least a decade.
The legislative stalemate may not represent a lack of will, 
but rather may be interpreted as a "rational" short-run 
response to a policy dilemma. We want foreign workers, but 
not their dependents. We allow illegal migration but keep the 
probability of arrest and deportation high enough to 
discourage the entry of family members. Amnesty, of 
course, would allow erstwhile illegal aliens to bring their 
dependents spouse, minor children, aged parents to the 
United States. This would given them access to our system of 
free public education as well as to the generous welfare and 
social service benefits that were designed to help Americans 
disadvantaged through no fault of their own. (The welfare 
benefits include Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC), Food Stamps, Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
and Medicaid.) Because we want the workers but not the 
dependents, and we find it awkward to say so openly, we 
perpetuate a cat-and-mouse game between the immigration 
authorities and illegal aliens.
If this interpretation is correct, we need not be concerned 
with more information on illegal aliens. We prefer continued 
obfuscation of the issues to the embarrassment that clarifica 
tion might bring. It is apparently better to let the monster 
sleep. Unfortunately, the monster will eventually wake up, 
and more massive social and economic problems may be at 
hand a large, restless and low-skilled illegal alien popula 
tion.
Characteristics of Illegal Aliens1
To put these matters in historical perspective, it is impor 
tant to indicate that the illegal alien issue is not new. In this
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decade we "celebrate" the 100th anniversary of illegal aliens 
in the United States. The first illegal aliens were Chinese 
because the first barriers to legal immigration were imposed 
against unskilled Chinese workers in the 1880s. There was a 
racist fear of the "Yellow Peril," of hoards of unskilled 
Chinese workers flooding California and depressing wages 
for similarly unskilled whites. It is unlikely that the feared 
massive migration would have taken place even if there were 
no barriers. Perhaps more intriguing, data from recent cen 
suses indicate that the descendants of the Chinese workers 
have achieved higher levels of schooling, occupational status 
and earnings than the descendants of the whites who a cen 
tury ago believed the Chinese could never be anything but 
unskilled laborers.
In the twentieth century, however, the main focus has 
been on Mexican illegal aliens. A cyclical pattern has emerg 
ed. During periods of political turmoil (e.g., 1910 Revolu 
tion) or economic slack in Mexico, large migration streams 
flow northward, and the size of these streams seems to have 
accelerated in recent decades. On the other hand, during 
periods of economic slack in the U.S., the northward flow is 
slowed or stopped, and sometimes reversed. In the recession 
following the World War I boom, during the early 1930s, 
and during the early 1950s, the net flow may have been 
toward Mexico, that is, the number of Mexican nationals 
who left the U.S. may have exceeded the number who 
entered this country. These reverse flows have sometimes 
been generated by wholesale arrests and deportations of per 
sons who "look Mexican."
Mexican nationals form the bulk of the illegal alien 
population in the 1980s the data on apprehensions in 
dicates that 90 percent are Mexican nationals. But this 
statistic overstates the proportion of Mexicans in the illegal 
alien population. Immigration and Naturalization Service
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concentrates its resources along the Mexican border, perhaps 
(as some allege) because it is relatively inexpensive to catch 
people sneaking across the border and deport them. In addi 
tion, many Mexican illegal aliens work in the United States 
only part of the year and return to Mexico during the slack 
season. Since apprehensions are most likely to take place at 
or shortly after entry, this to and fro migration also raises 
the proportion of Mexican nationals in the arrest data 
relative to the stock of illegal aliens residing in the U.S.
It is believed that about half of the illegal alien population 
living in the United States are Mexican nationals, and that 
the other half come from a wide range of countries and all 
parts of the globe. West Indians, Central and South 
Americans, East Asians, South Asians, Africans, Near 
Easterners, Europeans and Canadians are all represented 
among illegal aliens. Of the Mexican illegal aliens, about 70 
percent originate in six states of Mexico's Central Plateau. 
This is a poor area which served as a battlefield during the 
revolutions and rebellions earlier in this century, and which 
has been passed over by whatever benefits emerged from the 
Green Revolution of the 1950s and the short-lived oil bonan 
za in the 1970s (Cross and Sandos, 1981).
There are reasons why Mexico provides the largest number 
of illegal aliens. We share a border about 2,000 miles long 
which runs through wilderness areas. Where rivers form part 
of the border they are often shallow and easy to cross. 
Hence, "entry without inspection" is relatively easy for 
Mexican nationals. Illegal aliens from most other countries 
either use fraudulent documents to enter the U.S. or have to 
violate a legal visa, such as working in violation of a student 
or visitor visa, or overstaying their visa. Increasingly, na 
tionals of other countries are using Mexico and Canada for 
the purpose of surreptitiously entering the United States.
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Ease of entry may be a necessary condition for illegal im 
migration, but it is not a sufficient explanation. After all, the 
border with Canada is as easy to cross as the border with 
Mexico, yet there are relatively few Canadian illegal aliens: 
less than 1 percent of apprehended illegal aliens are Cana 
dian nationals. Nor are legal immigrants more numerous 
from Canada than from Mexico. In recent years there have 
been fewer than 15,000 Canadian immigrants annually, 
while legal immigrants from Mexico have exceeded 55,000 
annually.
The U.S.-Mexican border is unique. No other border 
separates two countries that differ so sharply in average in 
come. The temptation to go north to "strike it rich" working 
as a busboy, a dishwasher, or fruit picker is just too strong to 
resist. Mexico's economy has not done well in the 20th cen 
tury in spite of its abundance of natural resources. High fer 
tility rates combined with falling death rates, particularly in 
fant mortality rates, have generated large cohorts of youths. 
Government development policy has focused on capital- 
intensive rather than labor-intensive sectors of the economy. 
Mismanagement of the economy has retarded the rate of 
economic growth. The poverty and absence of job oppor 
tunities, particularly in the rural areas, have generated a 
massive migration to Mexico City, the border towns, and the 
United States.
Many Mexican farm workers gained experience working in 
the United States in the bracero program.This was a contract 
farm labor program started in 1942 to augment wartime 
labor supplies and was terminated in 1964. As a result of the 
experience gained in the bracero program, hundreds of 
thousands of Mexican farm workers had their appetites 
whetted for the good life up north. They, their younger 
brothers, their sons became illegal aliens when the bracero 
program ended and other opportunities for legal migration
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were reduced. Indeed, in the face of a growing supply of im 
migrants from Mexico the imposition of the numerical ceil 
ings on Western Hemisphere immigration in 1968, and the 
country ceilings in 1977, reduced avenues for legal migra 
tion, thereby generating pressures for increased illegal im 
migration.
There is little solid data on the demographic or labor 
market characteristics of illegal aliens (Chiswick 1984). The 
data on apprehensions suggest they are predominately low- 
skilled, young adult (age 18 to 30), males from Mexico. 
While it is undoubtedly true that the apprehensions data can 
be expected to exaggerate these very characteristics, it seems 
reasonable that qualitatively these characterizations are ac 
curate. Illegal aliens tend to be unskilled, in part because 
workers in higher skilled jobs may have more difficulty in 
masking their illegal status, and in part because an occupa 
tional license, certification or union membership may be re 
quired. In addition, because of the existence of skills that are 
specific to the country in which they are acquired, apprehen 
sions and deportations may be more costly for skilled illegal 
aliens than for workers with few if any skills. Thus, among 
unsuccessful visa applicants (or potential applicants) those 
with few or no skills have the greater incentive to attempt an 
illegal entry.
The skewed demographic composition of illegal aliens and 
the high rate of to and fro migration, particularly with 
respect to Mexico, are consequences of illegal alien workers 
leaving their wives, young children and aged parents in the 
home country. This does not arise from their preferences, 
but from the circumstances of their illegal status. Dependent 
family members are costly to move to the United States, par 
ticularly if illegal means are to be used. Once in the U.S., the 
dependents may not confer the eligibility for welfare and 
social service benefits that legal residents may receive. In-
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deed, the dependents may increase the probability of the en 
tire family being apprehended and deported, thereby increas 
ing the costs and risks of deportation.
Alternative Policies: Amnesty Versus 
Strict Enforcement
If illegal alien workers were granted amnesty and could 
bring their dependents to the U.S., the demographic 
characteristics of this population would change. The extent 
of to and fro migration would decline, the ratio of 
dependents to workers would increase, and, because of the 
low skill level, the family members would be eligibile for a 
variety of welfare (income transfer) and social service pro 
grams. In addition, the incentive for even more families to 
move north would increase under the realistic view that if 
amnesty is granted once it will be granted again. Hence, the 
case against amnesty.
But what about a more vigorous enforcement of immigra 
tion law? The trends have, if anything, been in the opposite 
direction (Chiswick 1981/82). The number of permanent 
positions in the Immigration and Naturalization Service in 
creased from 7,000 in 1960 to nearly 11,000 in 1979, a 60 per 
cent increase. During the same period, however, the annual 
number of legal immigrants doubled from one-quarter of a 
million per year to one-half of a million. Nonimmigrant ad 
missions of aliens as tourists, students, etc. increased 8-fold, 
from 1.1 million to 9.3 million per year. And, the number of 
apprehensions of illegal aliens increased 14-fold, from 
70,000 to about one million. Clearly a tremendous strain has 
been placed on INS resources.
To try to close the floodgates, INS has concentrated its 
resources on border enforcement at the expense of interior 
enforcement. However, there is a revolving door at the 
border in which large numbers of illegal aliens are ap-
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prehended one night, to be deported the next day, to try 
again on a subsequent night. Except for deportation, there 
are no penalties imposed on illegal aliens, even those who are 
flagrant repeat offenders. The cat-and-mouse game along 
the border increases apprehensions per million dollars of 
budget expenditure, but may have little deterrent effect.
Benefits of Current Policy
What are the benefits of current policy? The benefits come 
in the form of the increase in income to the native population 
of the U.S. from a larger pool of low-skilled immigrant 
workers. An increase in the supply of low-skilled foreign 
workers depresses the wages and working conditions of low- 
skilled native workers, and this receives much public atten 
tion. What receives less public notice is that the increase in 
the number of low-skilled workers increases the productivity 
of "complementary factors of production," that is, higher 
skilled workers and capital. Any factor of production is 
more productive the more of other factors with which it can 
work. A bulldozer on a road construction project is more 
productive if there are more workers to keep it running 24 
hours a day, repair it when it breaks down, and redirect traf 
fic away from the construction site. A scientist is more pro 
ductive if there are assistants to clean the test tubes, run sim 
ple experiments, do bibliographic research, type 
manuscripts, etc.
The gains in income to skilled workers and capital from 
the migration of low-skilled workers are likely to exceed the 
losses to native low-skilled workers. 2 This means that as a 
result of low-skilled illegal migration, the income of the 
native U.S. population is increased!
The Policy Dilemma
I have outlined the policy dilemma. As a result of restric 
tions on immigration, there are a large number of people in
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the U.S. illegally, perhaps 3 to 6 million people. They are 
disproportionately unskilled young adult males from Mex 
ico. Largely because of their illegal status, they do not bring 
their dependent family members. These workers are produc 
tive and they increase the income of the native U.S. popula 
tion.
On the other hand, if they brought their dependent family 
members with them they would be eligible for a variety of 
welfare, social service and educational programs. Since the 
workers are low-skilled, their use of these benefits could ex 
ceed the increased income of the native population. That is, 
the increase in taxes needed to pay for these programs for the 
dependents of the "illegal aliens" might easily exceed the 
gains in income to the native population.
With their status legalized, illegal aliens could bring their 
dependents to the U.S. and claim benefits from the variety of 
public programs that subsidize the poor, the young and the 
aged. Further, amnesty would encourage further illegal im 
migration because of the realistic expectation that if offered 
once it will be offered repeatedly. Hence, amnesty is perceiv 
ed as an unacceptable solution.
Strict enforcement of immigration law is also perceived as 
unacceptable. The costs of strict enforcement may be very 
high in terms of civil liberties and of resources devoted to en 
forcement activities. A greatly enhanced and better equipped 
staff of INS agents would be required to increase the effec 
tiveness of interior enforcement as well as border enforce 
ment, but this would be more costly. Sanctions against 
employers who knowingly hire illegal aliens are frequently 
proposed, although for employer sanctions to be effective a 
national identity system (or registration) of one sort or 
another would be required. It seems inappropriate to compel 
employers to enforce a law that the federal authorities show 
little will to enforce.
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Employer sanctions are the equivalent of an employment 
tax. This tax raises the relative cost of labor, particularly for 
low-skilled, high-turnover jobs. The imposition of such a tax 
may further worsen the job opportunities of low-skilled 
workers legally in the U.S., particularly youths and 
minorities.
But perhaps the greatest cost of strict enforcement would 
be the loss of the income the native population gains from 
the work of illegal aliens.
Conclusions—An Alternative Policy*
From the short-run perspective, the current legislative 
stalemate may be "optimal," given that we do not want a 
legal system that sanctions a two-class society one eligible 
for welfare and social service benefits and the other not. We 
can view amnesty and a stringent enforcement of immigra 
tion law as polar approaches to solving the problem, but for 
different reasons they are viewed as too costly. The conse 
quence of current policy, however, is the presence of a large 
and apparently growing segment of the population that lives 
at the margin of or outside the law. As this population 
grows, and as increasing numbers of children of illegal aliens 
are born in the U.S., and hence are U.S. citizens, the 
political and social pressures will also grow. A policy that 
looks optimal in the short run may thus not be so attractive 
in the long run.
This discussion suggests that, as a society, we need to more 
clearly delineate our priorities and policy options regarding 
illegal aliens. A partial solution to the dilemma is to restore a 
modest guest worker program. To discourage "temporary 
workers" from evolving into "permanent workers" outside 
the regular immigration system, entry would be permitted 
only for the guest workers and not for dependents, the con 
tracts would be for a short maximum number of months (say
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six months), and only for jobs with clearly defined seasonal 
patterns. Returning to the home country would be required 
before a worker could receive a new contract, and a limit 
might be placed on the total number of contracts that a 
worker could receive.
Under current policy there is some probability that an il 
legal alien will be apprehended. But the penalty if one is 
apprehended is very low, particularly for Mexican nationals 
apprehended at the border. Deportation involves little op 
portunity cost to a Mexican national apprehended at or near 
the border since he is likely to return almost immediately. 
Apprehending individuals who violate the law creates no 
deterrent effect if there is no penalty when they are ap 
prehended. Hence, current policy regarding apprehended il 
legal aliens has little or no deterrent effect, particularly 
regarding Mexican nationals.
To induce compliance, two types of penalties could be im 
posed on those who enter the country illegally, who violate 
the condition of a legal entry, or who violate the terms of 
their temporary worker contract. One penalty would be a 
probation period during which a legal entry is barred, 
whether as a temporary worker or otherwise. The other 
would be detention of the illegal worker for a period of 
several months prior to deportation.
Detention may be the only mechanism for reducing the ex 
tent to which the border is treated as a revolving door. 
Pecuniary penalties are inappropriate for the low-income il 
legal alien population because the fines could not be col 
lected. However, detention for several months would be 
costly to the alien and have a deterrent effect. Since much of 
the illegal immigration is for seasonal employment, a two or 
three month detention for a first apprehension could have a 
major impact on the incentive to seek work in the U.S. As a 
further deterrent, the length of the detention period could be
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increased with the number of times the individual has been 
apprehended.
The major criticism of detention is usually expressed in 
terms of the high cost of incarcerating "one million ap 
prehended illegal aliens.'* But this exaggerates the problem. 
Because the revolving door at the border results in multiple 
apprehensions of the same person, the number of different 
individuals apprehended is much smaller than the number of 
apprehensions. With the imposition of penalties, the number 
of attempted illegal entries would fall. As a result, the same 
border enforcement resources would mean fewer apprehen 
sions but would raise the probability that an attempted il 
legal entry would result in an apprehension further 
discouraging illegal migration. Indeed, with the imposition 
of meaningful penalties, greater deterrence could be achiev 
ed even with fewer border enforcement resources. Finally, 
low cost minimum security detention facilities could be con 
structed in rural areas near the Mexican border.
These policy recommendations will not end all illegal im 
migration. However, by providing both the opportunity and 
incentives for operating within the legal framework, they of 
fer a better hope than current policy, or the most frequently 
advocated alternatives (employer sanctions and amnesty), 
for retaining many of the benefits while reducing many of 
the costs of the current illegal immigration. The recommen 
dations offer a better prospect for regaining control over the 
U.S. borders.
NOTES
1. The Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Ser 
vice is an invaluable source of data on legal an illegal immigrants. (U.S. 
Department of Justice.)
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2. This follows from the increase in the aggregate income of the popula 
tion exceeding the earnings received by immigrants. For a clarification 
see Chiswick (1982), pp. 298-313.
3. For a fuller discussion of the policy alternatives see Cafferty, 
Chiswick, Greeley and Sullivan (1983).
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Immigration and the 
U.S. Taxpayer
Francine D. Blau
University of Illinois 
Urbana-Champaign
In recent years considerable national concern has focused 
on the issue of immigration. Two factors have contributed to 
this interest: first, an increase in the influx of immigrants in 
to this country both legal and illegal; and second, a change 
in the traditional sources of immigrants away from the Euro 
pean countries and towards Asia, Latin American and the 
Caribbean. Many perceive the current group of immigrants 
as less skilled, perhaps, and less highly educated than those 
who came a number of years ago; it is also feared that cur 
rent immigrants will be more difficult to assimilate. This has 
gelled into a concern over the impact of immigrants on the 
U.S. economy and on the economic well-being of native 
Americans.
As we shall see, public perceptions regarding shifts in the 
magnitude and sources of immigration are indeed correct. 
However, to say that such changes have occurred is not 
necessarily to say that they constitute a problem. 
Nonetheless, there are serious immigration policy issues con 
fronting the government. How many immigrants should we 
admit? Another problem, greater today than in the past, is 
whether we can determine the number of immigrants to ad 
mit. That is, can we control our own borders? What should 
we do about the current population of illegal immigrants liv 
ing in this country? Although economists cannot answer all
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these specific questions, they can assist policymakers by do 
ing research that sheds light on the economic impact of im 
migration on the United States.
There are two primary aspects to consider in addressing 
this issue. First, what type of individuals are the immigrants 
and how do they compare to the native-born population. 
The foreign-born still do not comprise an especially large 
proportion of the U.S. population. Because the flow of im 
migrants is greater than it was a few years ago, however, the 
composition of the population is changing. And we have the 
right to ask: Is this a change for the better or for the worse? 
Or is it perhaps not a significant change at all?
Another question that needs to be considered is far more 
difficult. What are the consequences for native-born 
Americans of this influx of immigrants? In particular, do 
immigrants compete for jobs with some particular sectors of 
the U.S. population? For these groups, what is the impact on 
their wages, unemployment rates, etc.?
It is necessary to answer these questions to get a com 
prehensive view of the economic impact of immigrants. In 
this paper, however, we concentrate on the first question. 
What kind of individuals are the immigrants, and how do 
they compare to native-born Americans? Within these con 
cerns we focus on the consequences for the American tax 
payer of this inflow of immigrants. We especially emphasize 
issues related to the utilization of transfer payments by im 
migrants relative to use by the native-born. Transfer 
payments are money paid by the government to individuals 
and their families under various circumstances, for example, 
welfare payments to individuals or families whose income is 
very low, unemployment compensation for people who have 
lost their jobs, or social security for people who have retired. 
Do immigrants receive more of such transfer payments and 
if so, why?
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Less emphasis will be given to the other side of the 
coin how much do immigrants contribute to the tax 
receipts of the government? But we shall also consider 
evidence that has a bearing on this issue. That is, how 
economically successful have immigrants been? This is rele 
vant because it is one of the fundamental facts of life that if 
you are economically successful in this country, Uncle Sam is 
going to share in that success to some extent.
Before turning to a detailed discussion of these issues, we 
first review trends in immigration in order both to establish 
in greater detail what recent trends have been, and to place 
them in historical perspective. As we shall see, the current 
situation, as well as the fears associated with it, are not 
historically unprecedented. In previous instances, those fears 
proved groundless, as they may in the current situation.
Trends in Immigration
The trends that have given rise to recent concerns are il 
lustrated in Table 1. The 1970s was indeed a period of in 
creased immigration flows compared to the two preceding 
decades, both in terms of the absolute number of immigrants 
and their size relative to the population. Further, the pace of 
change appears to be accelerating, with both the number of 
immigrants and their size relative to the population higher in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s than at the beginning of the 
decade. As a consequence of these developments, the 
foreign-born increased from 4.7 percent of the U.S. popula 
tion in 1970 to 6.2 percent in 1980. 1 While the size of the 
foreign-born group remains small relative to the population, 
it represents a 32 percent increase in their proportion over a 
10-year period. In addition, the concentration of particular 
nationalities in certain parts of the country for example, 
Cubans in Florida, Mexicans in the Southwest, and some of 
the Asian groups in the West means that the proportion of
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foreign-born is considerably higher than the national average 
in a number of localities.
Table 1 


































































































































SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of 
the United States, 1985.
a. Annual rate per 1,000 U.S. population, 10-year rate computed by dividing sum of an 
nual immigration totals by sum of annual U.S. population totals for same 10 years, 
b. October 1, 1819 - September 30, 1830. 
c. October 1, 1830 - December 31, 1840. 
d. Calendai years, 
e. January 1, 1861 - June 30, 1870. 
f. Includes transition quarter, July 1 to September 30, 1976.
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The public perception that there has been a shift in the 
place of origin of immigrants is also borne out by the data. 
Asians constituted only 6 percent of immigrants during the 
1950s, in comparison to 13 percent in the 1960s and 36 per 
cent in the 1980s. Immigrants from Latin America and the 
Caribbean increased their proportion of the total from 23 
percent in the 1950s to about 40 percent in the 1960s and 
1970s. Overall, these two sources of immigrants grew from 
29 percent of the immigrant group in the 1950s to 77 percent 
in the 1970s.
Table 1 shows that the U.S. has experienced two previous 
periods of substantial increase in immigration flows. Indeed, 
in both of the earlier cases the numbers involved were con 
siderably larger, both absolutely and relative to the popula 
tion. The first case was in the 1840s and 1850s. This was 
associated with an influx of Irish who increased their propor 
tion of immigrants from 12 percent in 1830 to about 45 per 
cent in 1840 and 1850. The second case was the great wave of 
immigrants who came in the late 1800s and early 1900s. 
Their numbers were totally unprecedented in American 
history, with 23.5 million arriving between 1880 and 1920. In 
1910, 18 percent of the population was foreign-born. There 
was also a change in the source of immigration at that 
time away from England, Scotland, Scandanavia, Ger 
many and Ireland and towards Southern, Eastern and Cen 
tral Europe, including such nationalities as Serbo-Croatians, 
Bohemians and Moravians, Austro-Hungarians, Russians, 
Greeks, Spaniards, and Turks.
In both these cases, there was a general impression that the 
new crop of immigrants was less skilled and less educated 
than the previous group, and considerable fear that the large 
mass of immigrants could never be digested and assimilated 
into the American mainstream. There was the belief that the 
immigrants were having a negative effect on the well-being
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of the American wage earner. Indeed these views were 
responsible for the passage of restrictive federal legislation in 
1921 curtailing the entry of immigrants. Nonetheless, there is 
probably general agreement today that the U.S. did readily 
assimilate these groups. And further, that these immigrants 
also enriched America with the many good things they 
brought to this country. Thus, based on the historical ex 
perience, we can perhaps confront our current problems with 
some degree of optimism about immigration.
Immigrants and the Transfer System1
In this section, we seek to ascertain whether or not im 
migrants utilize the transfer system to a greater degree than 
the native-born and what factors may be responsible for any 
immigrant-native differences. In seeking answers to these 
questions, it is important, not only to identify any average 
differences that may exist, but also to understand the 
underlying causes of any differences that are observed. This 
is necesssary because one of our goals will be to apply the in 
sights of what we learn about immigrants today to im 
migrants who may come in the future. Since future arrivals 
may differ from the present group in terms of their educa 
tion, race or ethnicity, etc., overall averages are not infor 
mative.
The data we use are from the 1976 Survey of Income and 
Education which gives income and transfer information for 
1975. This may be disappointing to some people. The con 
cern is about a current problem; can data that are 10-years- 
old be relevant to it? The problem that we confront in 
economics is that often the type of data needed to do the 
kind of careful and systematic analysis presented here are 
not collected very frequently. Further, it takes a considerable 
amount of time to perform these types of analyses. 
Nonetheless, such data can shed some light on the issues of
Immigration & the Taxpayer 95
concern to us, particularly when used to uncover the 
underlying causes of any immigrant-native differences. It is 
also encouraging that a recent study by Tienda and Jensen 
(1985), which used data from the 1980 Census, finds similar 
results for one of the types of transfer use we consider, 
immigrant-native differences in welfare dependency.
In looking at transfers, let us first distinguish between two 
types of transfer payments. The first are payments received 
from welfare programs. These include public assistance, 
which is generally paid by state and local governments, and 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), a federal 
program that is targeted on female family heads. Although 
families with unemployed fathers are technically also eligible 
in many states, the vast majority of recipients of AFDC are 
female family heads. Also included is Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI), a federal program which is targeted on the ag 
ed. Welfare programs share the common characteristic that 
they are paid for out of general tax revenues. In addition, 
eligibility for such programs, as well as the amount of money 
received, is determined by need, not by any kind of prior 
contribution or by prior employment of a certain kind.
The second type of transfer payments are payments from 
social insurance programs. These include social security, the 
railroad retirement program, unemployment insurance, 
workers' compensation, and various veterans' programs. 
These programs are paid for out of contributions by 
employers and/or workers and not out of general tax 
revenue. Eligibility for these programs entails employment in 
a so-called covered sector for a specified period of time. So, 
for example, not just anyone who becomes unemployed is 
necessarily eligible for unemployment insurance, and not 
just anyone who retires is necessarily eligible for social 
security, although the coverage of these programs has 
become fairly widespread. Payment levels, the receipts that
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people get from these programs, are guided primarily, 
although not solely, by the replacement ratio principle. The 
replacement ratio principle is designed to replace a specified 
proportion of income that has been lost through unemploy 
ment, disability, retirement, etc. In fact, in these programs, 
while need is sometimes taken into account, the basic idea is 
that if you were doing better before you entered the transfer 
program, you should receive a higher transfer payment.
The reason these two types of programs are distinguished 
is because the differences between them may be important to 
policymakers. That is, policymakers may distinguish be 
tween monies that are going to welfare recipients and those 
that are being collected by individuals through social in 
surance programs. This is because it is widely believed that 
the people getting social insurance payments have in effect 
earned that transfer payment through the prior contributions 
they or their employers have made. However, it should be 
noted that most contributory programs in the U.S. are in 
fact pay-as-you-go programs. For example, it is not the case 
under social security that the taxes you pay now are saved up 
for you and that when you retire at 65 you get the very 
money that you paid in, or the returns from investing that 
money. In fact, the social security taxes you pay today, go to 
support older people who are currently retired. Nonetheless, 
it is significant in the public mind that the recipients of 
payments from social insurance programs have made a con 
tribution towards financing the programs in the past (or their 
employers have done so).
Now that we have explained the differences between these 
two types of programs, let us look at the receipt of transfer 
payments by families headed by immigrants and the native- 
born in 1975 as shown in Table 2. Male-headed families (in 
cluding married couples) and female-headed families are 
distinguished. 3 A superficial examination of this table does
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lend some support to the idea that immigrants may well be a 
drain on the transfer system. Among both male- and female- 
headed families, immigrants receive higher transfer 
payments than the native-born. On average, the transfers 
received by families headed by a male immigrant were 52 
percent ($546) higher than the receipts of families headed by 
native-born males. As the table shows, this was due to im 
migrant families' greater likelihood of participating in each 
type of program (welfare and social insurance), as well as, 
the higher average level of payments received by immigrant 
families who were program participants. Interestingly 
enough, among female heads, immigrants receive lower 
welfare payments on average, but higher social insurance 
payments. Overall, their receipts from transfer programs are 
13 percent ($196) higher than their native-born counterparts, 
primarily due to their higher probability of participating in 
social insurance programs.
The questions we have to consider are why do these dif 
ferences exist and what are the policy implications of them? 
The first question may in turn be divided into two parts. 
First, we may determine whether immigrant families place 
greater reliance on transfer programs than native families 
with similar characteristics. So, if we found an immigrant 
family and matched it up with a native family in terms of the 
head's education, the number of family members, etc., 
would the immigrant family receive higher transfer payments 
than the otherwise similar native family? In other words, are 
immigrant families more transfer-prone? Second, we may in 
vestigate the role that differences in characteristics between 
the immigrant and native-born groups play in producing dif 
ferences in transfer receipts. That is, to what extent are the 
higher transfers received by immigrant families due to dif 
ferences in their levels of education, family composition, etc.
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SOURCE: Francine D. Blau, "The Use of Transfer Payments by Immigrants," Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review 37 (January 1984), Table 1, p. 223. Reprinted by permission. 
NOTE: Based on data from the 1976 Survey of Income and Education (SIE). Observations 
are weighted by sampling weights reported in the SIE. Family heads must be 18 years of age 
or older to be included.
In summary, we seek to determine to what extent the 
higher transfer receipts of immigrant families are due to 
(1) similar immigrant and native families acting differently 
and (2) the fact that immigrant and native families are not 
similar but rather differ in a variety of ways that are poten 
tially relevant to transfer use. We then consider the policy 
implications of these findings.
As illustrated in Table 3, immigrants have a variety of 
characteristics that could potentially increase their use of 
transfer payments. A higher proportion of immigrants than 
of native-born family heads are minorities. Immigrants are 
somewhat less likely to be black, but a higher proportion of 
them are comprised of other nonwhites or Hispanics. Since
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minorities tend to encounter greater difficulty in the labor 
market, a higher proportion of minorities among immigrants 
could contribute to a greater reliance on the transfer system.
Table 3
Means of Selected Characteristics 
1975
Male heads Female heads 
Characteristic Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants
Race-ethnicity (%)
Black 9 4 19 6 
Other nonwhite 1 10 1 6 
Hispanic 2 23 2 18
Age of head
Mean age 44 51 49 58 
% 65 or older 14 30 29 47 
% 18 to 30 27 17 29 13
Family members
% 65 or older 9 21 3 3
Number of children
under 18 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.4 
Education of head 12.1 10.7 11.6 9.7
English ability of head 


























SOURCE: Francine D. Blau, "The Use of Transfer Payments by Immigrants," Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review 37 (January 1984), Table 2, p. 225. Reprinted by permission. 
NOTE: Based on data from the 1976 Survey of Income and Education (SIE). Observations 
are weighted by sampling weights reported in the SIE. Family heads must be 18 years of age 
or older to be included.
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In 1975, immigrant heads of families had lower educa 
tional attainment on average than natives. Among men, they 
averaged over a year less of education; among the female 
heads of families, it was almost two years less education. Im 
migrants are also more likely not to be able to speak English 
or understand English well. Fifteen percent of the male and 
female immigrant heads could not speak or understand 
English well compared to less than 1 percent of native-born 
Americans. The location of immigrants might contribute to 
their higher use of transfer payments as well. Immigrants 
were more likely than natives to be located in metropolitan 
areas where transfer payments tend to be more generous or 
to be located in the Northeast where there is both a reputa 
tion and a practice of higher transfer payments, and they 
were much less likely to live in the South where transfer 
payments are lower.
The really key factor in explaining immigrant-native dif 
ferences, however, turns out to be none of the above, but 
simply the fact that immigrants on average are older than 
native-born Americans. For example, the average age of 
male native family heads was 44 compared to 51 years of age 
for the immigrants. Among the female family heads, the 
average age of the native-born was 49 compared to 58 for the 
immigrants. It is even more graphic if you look at the pro 
portion of family heads that are 65 years of age or over 14 
percent for the male natives compared to 30 percent for the 
immigrants. For female family heads, the figures are 29 per 
cent for natives and 47 percent for immigrants. In addition, 
in male-headed families a higher proportion of the other 
family members in the immigrant than in the native families 
are also 65 or over. Older people are obviously more likely to 
be retired and thus collecting social security benefits, Sup 
plemental Security Income, etc. So it is not surprising that an 
older population would be more transfer-prone. But these 
age differences raise two additional questions: (1) Why are
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the immigrants an older population? (2) If the immigrant- 
native difference in transfer payments is primarily due to the 
fact that immigrants are an older population, is the differen 
tial of concern from a policy point of view?
First of all, why are immigrants an older population? That 
simply has to do with the history of immigration discussed 
above. The age distribution of the native population is deter 
mined primarily by domestic birth and death rates. But the 
age distribution of immigrants is determined by the historical 
pattern of flows of immigrants into this country. As we have 
seen, these flows peaked in the late 19th and early 20th cen 
turies. Thus, a considerably higher portion of immigrants 
than of natives are elderly simply because a relatively high 
proportion of immigrants came in the late 1800s and early 
1900s. Another contributing factor is the impact of the post- 
World War II baby boom. A disproportionate share of the 
native population is relatively young because they were born 
during the baby boom years. But as Table 1 suggests, by 
1976, no comparable upsurge in immigration for that age 
group had occurred. This inference is borne out in Table 3 
where we see that a considerably smaller proportion of im 
migrant than of native heads was aged 18 to 30 in 1976 (i.e., 
born during the baby boom). Thus the answer to the first 
question of why the immigrants are an older population is 
simply historical accident.
What are the consequences from a policy point of view of 
transfer differentials that are due to such an age disparity? 
To the extent that it is due to this factor, a fairly strong case 
can be made that the higher utilization of transfer payments 
by immigrants does not represent a cause for concern. First, 
as with any investment in human capital, immigration is 
more profitable the earlier in the life cycle that it takes place. 
This is because there are more years over which to reap the 
returns to the investment. Since this is the case, most im-
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migrants come to this country at a relatively young age4 and 
the vast majority of the older immigrants have spent most of 
their working years, including their most productive years, in 
the United States. This means that they have already made 
substantial contributions to tax receipts and to contributory 
social insurance programs and it is not a matter of concern 
that as they become older they receive these transfer 
payments.
Second, to the extent that transfer payments to older in 
dividuals represent an intergenerational transfer from the 
current young population to the current older population, 
immigrants have their own working-age children who are 
making positive contributions to this system and thus in an 
overall sense are helping to support them.
Finally, the age distribution of immigrants can be 
manipulated by public policy in a beneficial manner. For ex 
ample, it could be used to even out population imbalances in 
age composition due to fluctuations in domestic birth rates. 
For example, since the baby boom was followed by the baby 
bust of the late 1960s through the 1980s, it might make sense 
to import immigrants to bolster the size of the young 
working-age population as these smaller cohorts enter the 
labor market. Of course, young people may prefer to have 
fewer individuals entering the job market with them and thus 
less competition. This consideration would have to be weigh 
ed too. In any case, the age distribution of immigrants is sub 
ject to public policy and from that perspective is not a cause 
for concern.
Is age in fact the primary reason for the observed dif 
ferences in transfer utilization? To answer that question, we 
first consider whether otherwise similar immigrant and 
native families do indeed behave similarly in terms of their 
transfer use. If the answer to that question is yes, then the 
reason for differences in transfer use between the two groups
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must be differences in their characteristics. The 
characteristics that are controlled for in testing for 
immigrant-native differences in behavior are (1) factors that 
contribute to potential labor market success, including 
(potential) experience, education, race and ethnic group;
(2) the presence of other income and assets that would have 
an impact on whether or not people need to turn to transfer 
payments and whether they qualify for them;
(3) demographic factors, such as the size and composition of 
families; (4) location, because, as mentioned earlier, some 
localities are more generous than others.
After controlling for the effects of these factors, it was 
found that behavioral differences between immigrants and 
similar native-born Americans were negligible. And, where 
differences did exist, they tended to favor the immigrants. 
Immigrants were less likely to be on welfare and collected 
lower welfare payments than otherwise similar natives. All 
else equal, receipts from welfare programs were estimated to 
be 59 percent lower among male-headed immigrant families 
and 57 percent lower among female-headed immigrant 
families. Holding other factors constant, immigrant families 
did collect slightly (2 percent) higher social insurance 
payments. On average, totaling the two together, for male 
family heads, the overall receipt of transfers were about the 
same for immigrant and native families, and, for female 
family heads, the transfer payments to immigrant families 
were actually 8 percent lower than to their native counter 
parts.
The time pattern of transfer receipts was also examined in 
terms of the length of time the family head had resided in the 
U.S. It was found that, all else equal, immigrants had lower 
welfare receipts at every duration of residence. That is, both 
recent immigrants and those who had been here for a long 
period of time collected lower welfare payments. Why is this
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the case? One possible explanation is that, as Chiswick 
(1978) points out, immigration tends to be selective of more 
highly motivated and able individuals. A simple rationale for 
this is that it takes more get-up-and-go if you are unhappy 
with your situation or simply believe you could do better 
elsewhere to move to a completely different society. The 
lower use of welfare by immigrants, all else equal, is addi 
tional evidence that they constitute a very highly motivated 
population. Thus, while the stereotype has developed that 
some people come to the United States in order to collect 
welfare or that immigrants are quick to fall back on public 
assistance, there is absolutely no support whatsoever in the 
data for those notions.
In contrast to the case of welfare, collection of social in 
surance transfers by immigrants in comparison to similar 
natives was found to vary with length of time in the country. 
When immigrants first arrive, they are less likely to collect 
social insurance payments than are native-born individuals. 
This is attributable to the fact that it takes a while to become 
covered to find the types of jobs that will make you eligible 
for these programs and to hold the jobs for a sufficient 
period of time. As their length of residence increases, im 
migrants are more likely to qualify for social insurance pro 
grams, and thus, receipts from these programs increase to 
the native level and eventually go a little bit beyond that.
Since differences in immigrant-native responses to the 
same characteristics do not appear to account for the observ 
ed differences in transfer receipts between the two groups 
reported in Table 2, the transfer differential must be the 
result of differences in the characteristics of immigrant and 
native families. As expected, age-related factors were found 
to play the major role. Age-related factors include not only 
the age of the household head, him or herself, but other 
things that are related to their age, such as the ages of other
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adult family members, the presence and ages of children, etc. 
Among males, age-related factors were more than sufficient 
to account for the immigrant-native differential in welfare 
receipts; they explained 98 percent of the differential in 
social insurance receipts and 99 percent of the differential in 
total transfer receipts. Among female-headed families, age- 
related factors accounted for 55 percent of the lower levels of 
welare received by immigrants. (The opposing effect of age- 
related factors on the welfare receipts of male- and female- 
heads probably reflects the greater relative importance of 
Supplemental Security Income among the former and Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children among the latter.) Age- 
related factors were sufficient to explain all of the higher use 
of social insurance and total transfers by female-headed im 
migrant families.
Interestingly enough, the higher proportion of minorities 
and those with poor English among immigrants did not, on 
net, increase their use of transfers. While families headed by 
a member of a minority group tended to receive higher 
welfare payments, all else equal, their receipts from social in 
surance programs were lower. The latter may be due to dif 
ficulty obtaining employment in the covered sector. On 
balance, their total transfer receipts were lower. Families 
whose head did not speak or understand English well were 
more likely to be on welfare than otherwise similar families, 
but were less likely to receive payments from social insurance 
programs (perhaps because of difficulty getting a job in a 
covered sector). Among program participants, their level of 
receipts from both types of programs (welfare and social in 
surance) was lower. This somewhat surprising result may be 
due to the family heads' difficulty in navigating the often 
complex welfare/social insurance systems given his/her poor 
English ability. Again, the net effect was that total transfer 
payments to such families were lower than their native 
counterparts. These findings are important because they im-
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ply that even if the proportion of immigrants comprised of 
minorities and those with poor English skills were to increase 
in the future, the use of transfers by immigrants relative to 
the native-born would not necessarily increase.
Economic Success of Immigrants
Let us now look briefly at the other side of the coin. We've 
been looking at what immigrants receive from the govern 
ment. We now turn to the question of what they pay to the 
government in the form of taxes. While information is not 
directly available on tax payments perse, economic success is 
a good indicator of the level of such payments. Using data 
from the 1970 Census, Chiswick (1978) has studied this issue 
extensively. He finds that, while earnings of immigrants are 
initially below those of similar native-born workers, they 
catch up to and eventually surpass their native-born counter 
parts in earnings. Chiswick finds that the catch-up time is 
about 13 years.
Using data from the 1976 Survey of Income and Educa 
tion, Blau (1984) reports similar findings for wages. Her 
estimated catch-up time is even shorter within 5 years. 
Since she controls for English-speaking ability while 
Chiswick does not, the Chiswick figure may be interpreted as 
the total time required by immigrants to catch up to natives, 
including the time necessary to acquire the requisite language 
skills. From a policy perspective this concept may be more 
relevant.
Regardless of which estimate of the catch-up period is 
used, however, the data suggest that the lifetime earnings 
(and consequently the lifetime tax payments) of an im 
migrant who spends most of his/her working life in the U.S. 
will most likely be higher than those of a comparable native- 
born individual. Of course actual tax payments will depend 
also on the characteristics of immigrants vs. the native-born.
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However, Sehgal (1985) has shown, using data from 1983 
Current Population Survey, that immigrant earnings catch 
up to those of the native-born in about 10 years even if per 
sonal characteristics are not controlled for.
Lest it be thought that these findings reflect the 
peculiarities of the contemporary situation, it is interesting 
to note that Blau (1980) uncovered a strikingly similar pat 
tern for the early 1900s. Thus, the tendency of immigrants' 
earnings to catch up to and eventually surpass those of their 
native counterparts appears to be an extremely well- 
established empirical pattern.
It has also been found by both Blau (1980) for the early 
1900s and Chiswick (1977) for 1969, that the children of im 
migrants are more economically successful than otherwise 
similar individuals who are the children of native-born 
parents. As discussed above, older immigrants have their 
own children in the U.S. who are contributing to social 
security and other taxes and thus helping to finance the 
transfer payments of older immigrants. The data actually 
suggest that, all else equal, they are making higher contribu 
tions than the children of natives.
Conclusion
A careful review of the evidence on transfer payments sug 
gests that immigrants do not appear to overburden the 
transfer system. There is no evidence that they have done so 
in the past and no indication that there is any reason to be 
concerned about the future. Indeed, immigrants were actual 
ly found to receive lower welfare payments than otherwise 
similar natives, and social insurance payments that were only 
slightly higher. While they did receive higher transfer 
payments, on average, this was primarily due to their being 
an older population. A briefer review of the evidence regard-
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ing the economic success of immigrants suggested that the 
tax payments made by them and by their children are likely 
to equal or exceed those of the native-born.
Three qualifications regarding these findings should be 
borne in mind. First, the data sets surveyed to reach these 
conclusions most likely underrepresent illegal immigrants to 
an unknown extent. Yet, the inclusion of illegals is not ex 
pected to greatly alter our findings. In fact it is likely that 
those who are in the country illegally, while paying the taxes 
they owe, are less likely to collect transfer payments than the 
legal group. The reason for this is simply that they would not 
wish to draw attention to themselves; not paying taxes might 
do so, as might attempting to collect transfers. For example, 
if you were in the country illegally, would you be likely to go 
to the unemployment insurance office and ask for your 
unemployment check? Would you be likely to get involved 
with the welfare system and have a caseworker visiting your 
house? It seems probable that whatever problems illegal im 
migrants may cause, a higher utilization of transfer 
payments is most likely not one of them. However, it should 
be emphasized that this is speculation. To definitively answer 
this question, better data on the numbers, behavior patterns 
and characteristics of illegal immigrants is needed.
Second, we pointed out that in terms of total transfer use, 
families headed by minority individuals received lower 
payments, all else equal. However, it was also true that the 
welfare receipts of this group were higher and the social in 
surance payments were lower than comparable families 
headed by whites or Anglos. To the extent that policymakers 
may wish to distinguish between contributory social in 
surance programs and noncontributory welfare programs, 
the higher proportion of minority individuals among im 
migrants could then be considered a cause for concern. 
Nonetheless, even if this is the case, it seems more equitable
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to try to alter the labor market situation which prevents the 
minorities from getting the better jobs in sectors covered by 
social insurance programs than to keep out minority popula 
tions from abroad.
Third, and most seriously, there is an extremely important 
question that has not been addressed here: what are the con 
sequences for native-born individuals of competition from 
immigrants? For example, if such competition results in 
higher unemployment for certain native-born groups, that 
could increase aggregate transfer payments, in this case those 
to native-born individuals. If competition from immigrants 
were to result in lower wages for some native-born groups, 
that could result in lower aggregate tax revenues. Thus, to 
fully address the issues considered here, we have to tackle the 
extremely difficult task of estimating the consequences for 
American workers of this competition from abroad.
NOTES
1. The statistics in the text on the origins and magnitude of immigration 
are from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1985 and Historical Statistics of 
the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, Part 1.
2. This section draws upon my article, "The Use of Transfer Payments 
by Immigrants," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 37 (January 
1984), pp. 222-239. I am grateful to the publisher for allowing me to 
summarize those results here. For an attempt to balance out the costs and 
benefits of immigration at an aggregate level, see Simon (1981).
3. In the interests of clarity, the traditional practice of designating the 
husband in a married couple family as the "head" is reluctantly follow 
ed.
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4. Among immigrant heads who were 68 years of age or older in 1976, 28 
percent of the men and 34 percent of the women arrived before 1920. An 
additional 62 percent of the men and 58 percent of the women arrived 
between 1920 and 1949; unfortunately, no more detailed breakdown for 
the 1920-1949 period is available from the Survey of Income and Educa 
tion. Similarly, among immigrant heads who were 65 or older, 88 percent 
of the men and 91 percent of the women arrived before 1950.
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U.S. Immigration Policy 
What Next?
Jagdish N. Bhagwati 
Columbia University
United States immigration policy stands at the crossroads.
We have had a remarkable and passionate debate. The 
Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy 
under Father Hesburgh's chairmanship was established in 
October 1978 in response to growing concerns that had 
already entered the public policy domain. It led, in turn, to 
the introduction of the Simpson-Mazzoli bill into the House. 
After nearly three years of tortuous legislative efforts to 
enact it into law, Simpson-Mazzoli died in conference at the 
end of the 98th Congress. By that time, the bill was already 
weighed under by numerous compromises from its original 
version, reflecting the exigencies of the legislative process 
that prompted the witticism that there are two things you did 
not want to see made: laws and sausage.
If we keep in view the facts that prominent intellectuals 
and editorial writers threw their support behind Simpson- 
Mazzoli, that the bill came very close to passage, that pas 
sions have been aroused and lobbies activated, it is not sur 
prising that the Congress has witnessed renewed efforts at 
immigration legislation. In fact, fears that Simpson-Mazzoli 
would rise again from its ashes led to early efforts by its op 
ponents in the 99th Congress at heading off this threat. 
Thus, Congressman Roybal had introduced a pre-emptive 
Bill HR 30 and Congressman Garcia held fresh hearings on
ill
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immigration policy before his Subcommittee on Census and 
Population, reflecting Hispanic concerns. Meanwhile, 
Messrs. Simpson and Mazzoli have parted company and 
each has sponsored new legislation aimed at immigration 
control, with Senator Simpson teaming up now with Con 
gressman Rodino this time around.
We need therefore to address, as clearly as we can, the 
question: where do we turn at this juncture? You might be 
tempted to dismiss this question on the cynical ground that 
the intense arguments of the last few years and the 
strangeness of the coalitions that formed around Simpson- 
Mazzoli suggest that matters have gone beyond enlightened 
analysis. Or you may fear that by now nothing worthwhile 
could have been left unsaid. I hope to convince you, 
however, that a fresh approach can indeed be proposed. And 
I trust that you will share my optimism that rational 
discourse has its role to play in every public policy debate, no 
matter how contentious the issue in question.
To devise an appropriate policy, we must define desirable 
objectives and suitable policy instruments to achieve those 
objectives. As I shall argue presently, both the Select Com 
mission and the Simpson-Mazzoli proponents shared essen 
tially two popular objectives (i.e., reducing the flow of illegal 
immigrants and rescuing these and the earlier stock of il 
legals from an underclass status) and had two less popular 
policy instruments (i.e., the employer sanctions and the 
amnesty program) to achieve them. I shall also argue that, 
ironically, these two policy instruments may be expected to 
produce the opposite results from those desired, reminding 
me of Max Weber's celebrated remark about the "paradox 
of unanticipated consequences." And I shall propose that we 
now think of a wholly different approach to achieving the 
Simpson-Mazzoli objectives. 1
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But, before I do that, I do wish to consider at the outset 
why immigration has come to be regarded as a major public 
policy question. A delineation, and then a dispassionate ex 
amination, of the concerns that have elevated immigration 
reform to our attention will serve to provide me with an 
assessment of the worthwhileness of the Simpson-Mazzoli 
objectives and hence to place my changed policy approach to 
them into proper context.
A Litany of Concerns
The most compelling aspect of the immigration situation 
today is that we have a significant amount of illegal immigra 
tion. The concerns of reasonable commentators, even if the 
conjectures on which they proceed are often unreasonable, 
proceed from this central fact. And indeed, the illegality of 
the immigration inflow, not the total legal numbers admitted 
by us annually, occupies the center of the stage. Why?
First, it raises the specter of vast inflows from a seething 
mass of humanity. Imagine becoming part of Greater Mex 
ico, or worse still, part of Greater Caribbean and Central 
America as well! The large numbers being bandied about on 
the "undocumented" aliens, the euphemism for illegal im 
migrants, have helped this alarmist perception. Unless we 
"regain control of our borders," we will be swamped. The 
faintly ridiculous zero population growth (ZPG) movement, 
which seeks to freeze population levels, has derived par 
ticular solace, and much mileage, from this cataclysmic 
scenario which I shall presently argue to be exaggerated.
Second, the illegality raises fear that it will breed more il 
legality in turn. This perception, while patently false, has 
been accentuated by the accounts of the Mariel Cuban im 
migrants' problems in Florida.
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Third, closely tied to illegality is the question of ethnicity. 
Many of the illegal immigrants are, naturally, Hispanics who 
can and do simply walk across the Rio Grande. Unlike in the 
immigration debates which attended the first enactment of 
our national immigration legislation in 1921, racist 
arguments simply will not be tolerated today. However, the 
heavy bias of the illegal influx in favor of Hispanics has rais 
ed more fear of encroachment by a second language more 
than by a different culture. Today, the iron fist of a domi 
nant Anglo-Saxon culture that tended to produce a 
homogeneous, assimilated mass of second-generation 
children who embraced the English language unquestioning- 
ly is no longer in evidence. The growing emphasis on ethnic 
diversity, and indeed pride therein, militates against the 
homogenization process. In this new cultural context, the 
Hispanic domination of the illegal influx, with threat of 
many more to come, creates serious concerns. 2
Fourth, illegality of the influx has created the apprehen 
sion that a finely tuned policy of immigration, delicately 
balancing costs and benefits to us through careful selection 
of numbers and composition, is being undermined by an un 
controlled inflow that must therefore, prima facie, be harm 
ful to us. This concern was especially acute during the pre- 
recovery slump when it was feared that a tough unemploy 
ment situation was being worsened by the "peso refugees'*: 
Hispanics moving north in search of jobs as the developing 
countries of Latin America, especially Mexico, got mired in 
the slump and drowned in their debt. 3 But the concern was 
also acute among some that illegals would prove to be a net 
burden on the fiscal system, though studies commissioned by 
the Hesburgh Commission found little support for this 
presupposition.
Fifth, and finally, illegal immigration has created a 
humanitarian issue. The illegal aliens represent an
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underclass, often subsisting better than where they came 
from, but evidently in conditions and with civil rights that, 
because of fear of seizure and deportation, are simply not 
asserted enough to be a practical reality. You may have 
heard the story of the Jewish couple who, on complimenting 
the illegal-immigrant Chinese waiter in a Brooklyn Szechwan 
restaurant for speaking tolerable Yiddish, found the 
manager rushing up to them and remonstrating: "Hush, he 
thinks he is learning English!" It is widely believed that con 
cern with this altruistic aspect of the immigration situation, 
rather than the more narrowly self-serving arguments I have 
detailed, led former Secretary of Labor, Ray Marshall, to 
persuade President Carter to adopt immigration reform as 
an important goal of his administration. Out of these con 
cerns came the two principal objectives of the Select Com 
mission and Simpson-Mazzoli. One was simply to restrict 
immigration, or rather the illegal component. The other was 
to ameliorate the deplorable conditions in which the 
underclass of illegal immigrants found itself.
Facts and Realities
I should emphasize immediately that the perception that 
we are being flooded by unusually large numbers of im 
migrants is not based on facts. For instance, legal immigra 
tion during 1950-1970, according to U.S. Bureau of Census 
data, has averaged less than half of the peak level during 
1900-1909! If adjustment is made for the rise in population, 
the reduction in legal immigration flows is even more strik 
ing. Immigrant inflows as a percent of resident U.S. popula 
tion has in fact fluctuated between less than 0.1 percent dur 
ing the war years to roughly 0.2 percent during 1950-1980, 
with a peak of 0.35 percent during 1980 when the absolute 
immigration inflow was just under 800,000. If adjustment is 
made further for emigration a phenomenon that partly 
reflects a life-cycle return of the immigrants, and which has
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been there since the 19th century the figures of net im 
migration fall somewhat further below the absolute levels of 
roughly 400,000 on average through the 1970s.
Yet another striking fact, brought to our attention by 
Kingsley Davis, is that the proportion of foreign-born to 
total population in the U.S. has been falling steadily since 
1910 until it was less than 5 percent in 1970, whereas it has 
risen in recent history in many countries including Australia, 
Switzerland, France and Sweden and, in fact, exceeds hand 
somely our 1970 proportion in these countries plus others 
such as Canada and New Zealand. For a country built on im 
migration, these facts suggest that our legal immigration 
policy has not been lax or overly generous in any persuasive 
sense.
The illegal inflow does impact on this argument, since our 
susceptibility to it is considered generally to be greater than 
in many of these countries, with the exception of France. But 
not by any means as much as the early claims in the range of 
8 to 12 million suggested by Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS). These estimates, unfounded as they were, pro 
fited from a law I have formulated: that any statistics will 
win against no statistics. And these numbers came to be 
widely circulated. Studies prompted by the Select Commis 
sion have now dispelled the myths they created. 4 It appears 
that, in the late 1970s, the stock of illegal residents is likely to 
have been between 3.5 and 6 million not more. That means 
that the flow is likely to have been substantially less, for the 
border has been a porous sieve for quite some time.
My own judgment, given these numbers, is that immigra 
tion reform arguments based on immigration being "too 
large" are implausible. Any economist familiar with the 
theories of the consequences of immigration must admit to a 
complex of positive and negative effects. With the immigra 
tion flows being such small proportions of the population
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and the workforce, the net economic gains or losses (if any) 
from these levels of immigration must shrink into relative in 
significance.
I would be tempted to conclude therefore, that, at least as 
far as the economic effects of the present immigration levels 
are concerned, there should not be cause for alarm. That im 
migration, therefore, may be treated as a phenomenon 
rather than a problem. In fact, if one looks not merely at the 
short-term effects of the current recovery but also at 
demographic trends that project a labor shortage by the early 
decades of the next century, it is possible to contemplate with 
greater equanimity the fearful projections of growing 
streams of new immigrants from the Caribbean and Latin 
American countries, propelled to us by distress, disruption 
or simply desire.
No one can, however, firmly refute the grim scenarios. 
Doubtless, Puerto Ricans have not flooded the U.S., empty 
ing their land. Italians have not moved en masse to West 
Germany from the poverty of the south, despite freedom of 
movement in the European Community. Wages are typically 
not equalized, even within the same country, by migration. 
Custom, commitment, risk-aversion, hope, family, attach 
ment to land, financial incapacity to move: these and other 
economic and social factors shape and constrain outmigra- 
tion to the more prosperous areas. But large movements do 
occur. Responsible immigration policy cannot be predicated 
on the most promising scenarios. As the financier Felix 
Rohatyn would put it, this would be like "betting the com 
pany."
The Two Objectives
I therefore accept, as a reasonable policy objective, the 
premise that we should bring illegal immigration under con 
trol.
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As I have stressed already, the other Simpson-Mazzoli ob 
jective, which I happen to share with greater enthusiasm, is a 
social and moral one. The illegal aliens who get in, willy- 
nilly, past the door are indeed, despite Brusati's poignant 
Bread and Chocolate, substantially better off than where 
they come from. But they are at the bottom of our social and 
economic hierarchy, living in conditions that are significant 
ly below what our moral standards require. If they live 
abroad in appalling conditions, exploited and destitute, 
distance places them beyond our view and responsibility. But 
in our midst, even though illegally, their condition offends 
our moral sensibility. The condition of the underclass cannot 
be ignored by a civilized society, certainly not by ours. 5
The Simpson-Mazzoli Policy Instruments
The approach embodied in Simpson-Mazzoli, and indeed 
originating in the recommendations of the Select Commis 
sion, offered two policies to address these two objectives. 
Both policies, employer sanctions and an amnesty, were far 
less popular than the two objectives. For example, compell 
ing objections to employer sanctions were raised in Hispanic 
circles.
As Antonia Hernandez, speaking for the Mexican 
American Legal Defense and Educational Fund before 
Representative Garcia's Subcommittee, remarked 
(December 9, 1982):
Employer sanctions won't work and will 
discriminate . . .
The ID system: I am reminded that during Father 
Hersberg's [sic] testimony in favor of H.R. 7357, 
he said there was nothing discriminatory with an ID 
system. He used an example I would like to restate 
here. He carries ID cards, the American Express 
and as Chairman of the Board of Chase Manhattan
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Bank. Those cards are symbols of prestige, of 
status.
The ID system, any ID system to [the Hispanic] 
community will carry a badge of inferiority, a 
badge that we, each and every one of us will have to 
carry. We will not be able to show our American 
Express. We will not be able to show our American 
passport, or that we are on the board of a Fortune 
500 company.
To the members of the Hispanic community, the 
employer sanctions and the ID will be that badge of 
inferiority. We will have to prove who we are just 
because of the color of our skin and the accent in 
our speech.
I must confess that I have considerable sympathy for the 
Hispanic concerns. My first reaction was, of course, unsym 
pathetic since I tended to discount the possibility of 
discrimination that could follow the enactment of employer 
sanctions much as Father Hesburgh did. My views now are 
somewhat changed, for I cannot discount fears that are so 
widespread and obviously rooted in personal experiences of 
the Hispanic community. But, even if there were no other 
objections to their enactment, employer sanctions, and in 
deed amnesty, together define a set of policy instruments 
which are unlikely to achieve the intended objectives. In fact, 
they may lead to exactly the opposite results from those 
desired! Let me argue why.
The Simpson-Mazzoli approach, as stated, rested on two 
policy instruments: employer sanctions and an amnesty. 
Employer sanctions would make it illegal to hire un 
documented aliens. In eliminating the 1952 Texas proviso, 
the Bill in its conference committee version would have even 
imposed criminal penalties for persistent infractions. By
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"cutting off jobs" in the U.S, the Bill (and indeed the Select 
Commission before it) expected to eliminate the magnet that 
draws in the illegals and thus cripple their inflow. Coupled 
with the sanctions was, of course, the amnesty provision. 
While simultaneously expected to play the political role of 
lubricating Hispanic consent to the employer sanctions, its 
principal rationale was surely the rescue of the enormous 
backlog (or stock) of illegals from its underclass status. Be 
tween them, the sanctions and the amnesty would then 
eliminate the stock of illegals, cut deeply into their new in 
flow and thus achieve the desired twin objectives.
Ironically, however, these two policies are likely to in 
crease the illegal inflow, and therefore, shortly thereafter, 
the stock as well, whereas I am afraid that the underclass 
status may paradoxically worsen.
Simply put, the problem is that employer sanctions can be 
expected to be ineffective (quite consistent with the possibili 
ty that, as the Hispanic community fears, they will impact 
adversely on the civil rights of that community through 
discrimination in hiring), owing to reasons which are deeply 
rooted in our social, political and juridical traditions. At the 
same time, sanctions will draw resources away from border 
enforcement where the numbers that daily get past our 
border patrol are naturally affected somewhat by the level of 
enforcement. Thus, the net result could well be, paradoxical 
ly enough, an increase in the rate of illegal immigration! At 
the same time, by increasing the harassment at work, 
employer sanctions could well increase the sense of exposure 
and vulnerability characteristic of the underclass status.
The ineffectiveness of employer sanctions can be safely 
predicted. Self-interest alone can be expected to lead the 
employers to oppose the INS through lobbying and litiga 
tion, draining its budget and weakening effective enforce 
ment. Such a prospect also derives from the several, highly
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articulate and energetic lobbying groups of ethnic Americans 
who, as before this subcommittee, have in fact opposed 
employer sanctions strenuously. But if self-interest alone was 
involved in weakening the effectiveness of employer sanc 
tions, I would be less pessimistic than I am. As it happens, 
morality is the more critical factor and, in this instance, only 
weakens further the enforceability of sanctions. Our natural 
instincts make it hard to collaborate in efforts to seize and 
deport, no matter what we think of illegal immigration in the 
abstract. The critical factor is that we are dealing with 
human beings. As the Swiss novelist Max Frisch has remark 
ed of the guestworkers' experience in Western Europe: "we 
asked for workers but got men instead."
The intense moral dilemma posed by this fact is illustrated 
again and again in our experience with enforcing immigra 
tion laws. Thus, our courts have repeatedly (though not 
always) struck down discrimination against legal aliens, 
defining a civil rights tradition that is truly laudable and 
almost unique. But they have gone further and found in 
favor of even illegal aliens who, it has often been argued, 
have no locus standi in the first place in view of their illegal 
presence! Notable here are the celebrated Texas judgment in 
1980 by Federal Judge Woodrow Seals who upheld the rights 
of illegal aliens' children to public education, and the 1984 
Supreme Court ruling that illegal aliens are entitled to the 
protection of federal labor laws. A Corpus Christi, Texas 
jury initially acquitted Jack Elder on charges of illegally 
transporting aliens into the U.S. although he was later con 
victed in a federal court. Mr. Elder's defense was simply a 
moral one, i.e., that he and his associate Roman Catholic lay 
workers were offering sanctuary to Salvadorans fleeing 
political persecution! 6
Yet again, it is remarkable that in the case of the Haitian 
boat people, when the administration reacted to their arrival
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by unprecedented incarceration, it was not long before civil 
rights groups took up their cause, resulting in some relief and 
protracted legal proceedings awaiting resolution. Therefore, 
I would argue that the much discussed finding of the GAO 
that employer sanctions have not been particularly effective 
elsewhere, 7 even though some countries such as France and 
Canada have chosen subsequently to increase their reliance 
on them, applies with unquestionable force in our case.
By contrast, enhanced border enforcement has resulted in 
increased interceptions. Between 1965 and 1970, the seized il 
legals tripled to well over 300,000 annually. In recent years, 
the numbers have approximated as much as a million. 
Doubtless, this reflects increased attempts at entry. But it 
would be ludicrous to suggest that stepped-up enforcement 
by the Border Patrol, now totaling over 2,500, has played no 
role. Even if every intercepted alien tries to get back in again 
(and indeed many must, if the million annual interceptions 
are to be reconciled with the scaled-down illegal stock 
estimates suggested earlier by me), the increased rate of ap 
prehension from more enforcement must affect in some 
degree the total numbers that successfully get through. The 
reduction in inflows, in this fashion, is not likely to be very 
substantial any more than India can hope to stem the tide of 
Bangladesh immigrant influx into Assam by building a fence 
and stepping up its enforcement along a massive, quasi-open 
border. But it is certainly likely to be greater than from 
employer sanctions, dollar for dollar.
As for the amnesty program, the other pillar of the 
Simpson-Mazzoli architecture, I am afraid that too is flaw 
ed. One can plausibly maintain that it could accelerate the in 
flux, magnifying the total size of the illegal immigrant 
population in the foreseeable future, while increasing their 
underclass status. Although the numbers who seek to come 
across are not sensitive to small changes in relative wages, 
the disparities between Mexico and the U.S. being so enor-
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mous, it is probable that a dramatic improvement in wages 
expected here could make a noticeable difference in the 
numbers that do wish to try to get past the border. Unfor 
tunately, from this viewpoint, an amnesty creates the prob 
lem that it translates an illegal status with a low associated 
wage into legal status with a distinct improvement in the 
wage earned, now and through subsequent upward mobility 
along the legal job ladder. Since, in economics and in public 
policy, bygones are rarely bygones, an amnesty now may 
well lead to the expectation of an amnesty again, in which 
case we would be encouraging more to attempt illegal entry. 
Then again, if Representative Garcia is right that the most 
liberal amnesty program that we can get through the House 
and enact into legislation will not legalize more than 25 per 
cent of the suspected undocumented population currently in 
the United States, we face the ironic outcome that the amnes 
ty will eventually lead to more illegal immigrants here than 
we rescued from that status. Caution about the small pro 
portion that will likely secure the benefit of the amnesty is in 
deed well-grounded in view of the numerous constraints that 
afflict eligibility and the associated problems that pertain 
thereto.
Is it not also likely that the INS will feel compelled, once 
an amnesty has been offered and implemented, to "go 
after" and harass more intensely those who remain illegal? 
Those not reborn may appear the more damnable! Greater 
internal enforcement, with or without employer sanctions, 
that will probably follow the completion of the amnesty pro 
gram, will only make the large numbers of present and arriv 
ing illegals more insecure, accentuating their underclass 
status and psychology.
A Different Approach
I propose therefore that we take an altogether different 
approach. In essence, we should greatly diminish internal en-
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for cement and correspondingly increase external enforce 
ment, i.e., at the border. As I have already stressed, border 
enforcement cannot greatly reduce, leave aside eliminate, the 
influx as long as we (quite correctly) seek to control the 
border in a way consistent with our moral sensibilities and 
traditions which preclude Soviet bloc-style techniques. I 
wish, of course, that we showed the same sensibilities where 
we extend economic aid and patrolling capabilities to a coun 
try which then is, in effect, "bribed" into taking into its own 
population, potential emigrants to our shores, the kind of 
morally offensive action that we ourselves would not take 
against them! Evidently, I have in mind our relationship with 
Haiti in this regard. But, despite our morally constrained 
techniques of border enforcement, such enforcement will 
doubtless have some impact.
Besides, border enforcement would be sufficiently visible 
to satisfy those who feel that we should be "doing more" to 
regain control of our border. In public policy, the advantage 
of such visible, symbolic action is much too understated. 
Where a problem is not capable of total solution, such action 
acquires great importance. Thus, while I believe that the late 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's decision to construct a fence 
along the enormous India-Bangladesh border in the State of 
Assam was an ineffective policy, and (before the Indian 
government suspended the construction owing to 
Bangladesh governmental protests) I had a bet with the then 
Governor of Assam that it would only be a matter of weeks 
before the fence would be selling inch by inch in the bazaars 
of Dacca in Bangladesh, I believe that it was nonetheless a 
splendid policy. For, to be seen to be doing nothing at all, 
even though one could not really close the border, would 
have been politically explosive since it would have been read 
as indifference or indecisiveness. And building the fence was 
the least disruptive way of doing nothing while appearing to 
be doing something!
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In our instance, enhanced border enforcement will indeed 
produce some tangible result, for reasons I have spelled out. 
But it needs to be supplemented by what I believe is a more 
effective policy, which is indeed the "price" counterpart of 
the enforcement policy. It is also a policy which builds up 
over the long haul when the more alarming scenarios of 
stepped-up attempts at entry might be more relevant. This is 
the active encouragement of the creation of an "economic 
fence" at the border, by promoting investments and 
economic activity along the long border. This "economic 
fence" can then act as an incentive to step off the escalator 
to the United States hinterland. We need to explore actively, 
keeping the government of Mexico informed and in con 
sultation, the creation of such an economic fence, envisaging 
something like the counterpart of "free trade zones" around 
the world. The economic fence would instead be a "free 
mobility zone" with investment benefits that attract the 
economic activity that would constitute the fence-principle 
that I envisage. 8
As we shift our attention to the border to regulate the in 
flux of immigrants, I would simultaneously downgrade in 
ternal enforcement. 9 This would include dropping the idea of 
employer sanctions. It would also mean going easy on INS 
enforcement, much as we did during the last census count. A 
de facto policy posture of this kind, which preserves the im 
portant distinction between legality and illegality while not 
seeking to divide the population energetically into the two 
categories through INS activity, would substantially reduce 
the unease of the illegal aliens that makes their exploitation 
rather easier.
This mix of policies, which puts the focus of immigration 
control and reform back at the border, offers the prospect 
therefore of getting as close to our two central and popular 
objectives as is possible. Mainly it requires executive action
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to reduce INS enforcement at home (an art, I might remark, 
the administration has practiced successfully with some 
other agencies), legislative action to increase the border en 
forcement budget substantially, and an active encourage 
ment of the "free mobility zone" program I have suggested.
NOTES
1. See also my opinion editorial article, "Control Immigration at the 
Border," Wall Street Journal, February 1,1985 and my testimony before 
Congressman Garcia at the Subcommittee on Census and Population, 
House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, on March 26, 1985.
2. James Fallows, Washington editor of The Atlantic, has been par 
ticularly concerned with this aspect of the immigration question. See also 
his testimony before Congressman Garcia on March 26, 1985, op. cit.
3. This issue has surfaced with greater urgency in public perception 
recently, as the collapse in oil prices and the accentuation of the debt 
crisis in Mexico since January 1986 have been accompanied by a reported 
surge in the number of apprehensions of illegals attempting to cross the 
border. Thus, the New York Times (February 21, 1986, pp. Al and A15) 
reports: "The Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Ser 
vice warned today that, there has been a 'startling' surge of illegal aliens 
entering the United States from Mexico in recent months. 'We are seeing 
the greatest surge of people in history across our Southern border,' Com 
missioner Alan C. Nelson said at a news conference called to renew the 
agency's appeal for tougher immigration laws." In turn, the New York 
Times (February 24, 1986) renewed its call to the President to support the 
passage of the immigration bills before Congress, especially the employer 
sanctions which I discuss and reject below.
4. See, in particular, the study by the staff of the Bureau of the Census 
for the Select Commission, conducted by Messrs. Siegel, Passel and 
Robinson, and included in Appendix E of the Commission's Final 
Report.
5. Two observations are pertinent. Where we insist on treating im 
migrants, legal and illegal, on a par with natives, the "cost" of immigra 
tion rises relative to potential benefits. Insofar, therefore, as we reject 
immigrants on the ground that their immigration is harmful to us, there
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is a moral-philosophical dilemma here: by insisting on equality of treat 
ment if we admit them, we reject their entry and thus force them to live 
abroad in yet greater destitution (but safely distant from our view)! Next, 
our aversion to treating immigrants differentially from natives itself may 
be consonant with the way, psycho-culturally, U.S. society treats 
adopted children on a par with natural children. Perhaps it is not surpris 
ing that Japan, where adoption is relatively infrequent and confined 
generally within relatives (as in the classic case of the novelist Soseki Nat- 
sume), the attitudes towards immigrants, whose entry is severely 
restricted, is not exemplary whereas the United States exhibits the op 
posite pattern in both dimensions.
6. As of going to press, the question of sanctuary is still in the courts, 
arousing intense passions of the kind which I believe to be precisely what 
would undermine the efficacy of attempts at enforcing sanctions.
7. In August 1982, the GAO released their report: Information on the 
Enforcement of Laws Regarding Employment of Aliens in Selected 
Countries. The study was conducted at the request of the Senate Sub 
committee on Immigration and Refugee Policy, Committee on the 
Judiciary. Based on questionnaire replies by 20 countries and visits to 
four (Canada, Germany, France and Switzerland), these latter all having 
some form of employer sanctions, the GAO study found that the sanc 
tions were generally ineffective for reasons including the facts that judges 
were generally too lenient, regarding illegal employment as not a 
"serious offense." This underlines exactly the point that I am making in 
this lecture. See also the statement by William Anderson, director, 
General Government Division before the Subcommittee on Census and 
Population, House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, on The 
Demographic Impact of Immigration on the United States, in the 
presence of Congressman Garcia, on March 26, 1985.
8. Such an economic fence on the Mexican side would have the advan 
tage that one could legally pay wages lower than the U.S. minimum wage 
but higher than in Mexico, and thus hold illegals back from attempting 
entry since slightly lower wages would be traded off against legality and 
Mexican residence in contrast to residence in U.S. as an underclass.
9. The irrational fascination with internal enforcement (perhaps also a 
puritanical reaction against those "aiding and abetting" in the violation 
of our "sovereign borders" and defense thereof) in preference to border 
enforcement is apparent also in other areas, e.g., narcotics traffic. 
William Safire recently wrote in the New York Times (February 26,
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1986): "The most glaring difficulty in our war on drugs is that we have 
all but abandoned the front line: the border is relatively undefended. The 
classic bureaucratic battle between the Justice Department, which 
believes in tips by informants and criminal prosecutions, and the 
Customs Service of the Treasury Department, which tries to interdict 
drugs at our borders, has been won by Justice."
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